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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
DISCIPLINE OF THOMAS V. 
RASMUSSEN 
Utah State Bar No. 2693 
Appellant. 
Case No.: 20110696 
c 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION 
UT. R. APP. P. 3(a) and UTAH CODE ANN. §78A-3A-102 (3)(c) provide this Court 
with jurisdiction. This appeal is from the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order of 
Disbarment (the "Order") entered by the Third District Court, on August 1, 2011, the 
Honorable L.A. Dever, presiding. The Order is attached as Addendum "A." 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS. STATEMENT 
OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL. AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
ISSUE I: Did the court exceed its jurisdiction in proceedings conducted under UT. LAWYER DISC. AND 
DlSAB. 14-524 by entertaining OPC's objection to Rasmussen's reinstatement to the practice of 
law outside the scope of the ten-day period of time contained therein? 
PRESERVATION: Rasmussen's Amended Response to OPC's Motion for the Court to Consider 
Evidence of Thomas V. Rasmussen's Failure to Comply To Its Sanctions Order filed on May 18, 2011. 
However, "[b]ecause subject matter jurisdiction goes to the heart of a court's authority to 
hear a case, [citation omitted], it is not subject to waiver and may be raised at any time, even 
if first raised on appeal." In re Adoption of Baby E.Z.. 2011 UT 38,1J25, -P .3d- ; see, e.g., 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Johnson v. Johnson. 2010 U T 28, ^[10, 234 P.3d 1100. Excess of jurisdiction is a lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction. See, Atwood v. Cox. 55 P.2d 377 (1936). 
S T A N D A R D O F REVIEW: "Whether this court has subject matter jurisdiction is a 
question of law that we review under the correction of error standard, affording no 
deference to the court's legal conclusion." Jenkins v. Jordan Valley Water Conservancy Dist. 
2012 U T App 1, Ifll, — P.3d — . 
ISSUE II: Did the court abuse its discretion in relitigating Rasmussen }s reinstatement or, alternatively, 
in granting OPCpost-judgment relief from the Reinstatement Order when both OPC's objection 
and subsequent motion failed to adequately articulate or support the requests under applicable 
provisions of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedures? 
PRESERVATION: Rasmussen's Amended Response to OPC's Motion for the Court to Consider 
Evidence of Thomas V. Rasmussen's Failure to Comply To Its Sanctions Order filed on May 18, 2011, 
together with oral arguments at the Motion Hearing at R0557 at p . 18. 
S T A N D A R D O F REVIEW: This Court: reviews a "motion for relief from judgment for 
an abuse of discretion." Robinson v. Baggett. 2011 U T App 250, \ 13, 263 P.3d 411 (citation 
omitted). However, it "review[s] any underlying legal questions for correctness." Id. "[The] 
application of res judicata presents a question of law, which we review for correctness." 
Grynberg v. Questar Pipeline Co.. 2003 U T 8, \ 21 , 70 P.3d 1. 
ISSUE III: Alternatively if the procedure below is sustained by this Court, did Rasmussen have a right 
to rely on his sanction being in the form of the court lifting the stay and imposing the one-year 
suspension? 
PRESERVATION: Rasmussen believed the suspension to be 181 days, but believed he 
was at risk for the one-year suspension if he failed to fulfill the conditions of the Sanctions 
Order. R0558 at p . 24. The court acknowledged the stay and that it needed to determined 
"whether or not Mr. Rasmussen is allowed to rely upon tha t . . . " R0558 at p . 25. O P C 
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acknowledged "...February 16th as the 181 days when the stay would have been up, . . ." 
R0557atp. 5. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "In reviewing attorney discipline cases, 'we review the 
court's findings of facts under the clearly erroneous standard.'" In re Discipline of 
Doncouse. 2004 UT 77, Tj 9, 99 P.3d 837, citing In re Ennenga. 2001 UT 111, \ 9, 37 P.3d 
1150. "However, 'we reserve the right to draw different inferences from the facts than those 
drawn by the court.'" Id., citing Ennenga at ^ 9 (quotation and citation omitted). "A 
different standard, however, applies to our review of the sanction imposed by the district 
court...[i]t is our duty to make an independent determination as to the appropriate sanction 
to be imposed." Id. at \ 10, citing Ennenga at ffl| 9-10. "We do not administer the sanction 
of disbarment lighdy; we understand its devastating effects on an attorney." Id. at ^ 16, citing 
In re Johnson. 2001 UT 110, \ 14, 48 P.3d 881. 
ISSUE IV: Alternatively, did the court err in concluding that disbarment was the presumptively correct 
form of discipline and in failing to account for mitigating circumstances'? 
PRESERVATION: Mitigating circumstances were presented at the Motion Hearing. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: See, Issue III Standard of Review listed supra. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
A. SUP. CT. R. OF PROF. PRAC.; UT . LAWYER DISC. A N D DISAB. Rules 14-501, 14-509, 
14.524,14-525,14-526,14-606, and 14-607. 
B. UT.R.CIV.P. 59 and 60. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On May 27, 2009, the Office of Professional Conduct ("OPC") filed a Complaint (the 
"Complaint") against Thomas V. Rasmussen ("Rasmussen"). R0001. The Complaint 
3 
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alleged that Rasmussen represented John Schriver in 2007 in Seventh Judicial District Court 
before Judge Anderson on a criminal matter (the "Schriver Case"). R0002. Trial was set 
for November 9, 2007, and the parties informed the jury would be summoned on October 
26, 2007, with no plea bargain accepted thereafter. R0003. The Complaint alleged 
Rasmussen came to a consensus with the prosecutor about a plea bargain on October 26, 
2007, but was cautioned that court approval was required. Id. 
The Complaint indicated that Rasmussen sent a letter reciting the plea agreement on 
October 29, 2007, to the prosecutor and faxed it to the court. Id. The fax was received at 
10:00 a.m. by the court; however, Judge Anderson was out of town and did not review it 
until November 5, 2007, and thereafter rejected the plea and proceeded towards trial on 
November 9, 2007. R0004. 
Rasmussen filed to recuse Judge Anderson on November 6, 2007, which motion was 
denied by the presiding judge on November 7, 2007. R0005. Rasmussen filed a 
supplemental affidavit in support of recusal November 8, 2007. The Complaint alleged a 
party could only file one recusal motion under UT R. ClV. P. 29(c)(1)(c), believing 
Rasmussen's affidavit to be a second one filed in an attempt to strike the trial date. Id. 
On November 8, 2007, Rasmussen's staff informed the court he would not be 
attending the trial. Id. The trial was not held, although all except Rasmussen appeared. 
R0006. Rasmussen was found in contempt for failure to appear and sanctioned $1,000 to 
cover expenses for the trial and $1,000 under Rule 11. Id. 
On July 20, 2009, Rasmussen filed his Answer (the "Answer") to the Complaint, 
arguing that the plea bargain was finalized before end of business Friday, October 26, 2007, 
4 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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with a letter to memoralize the agreement sent on Monday morning, October 29, 2007. 
R0017-R0018. Rasmussen argued the supplemental affidavit was a motion to reconsider, and 
cited his courtesy call to the court to inform them he would not attend given the motion 
filing. R0020. 
On May 24, 2010, OPC filed its Sanctions Hearing Brief requesting a one-year 
suspension for Rasmussen because of his misconduct. R0132. OPC argued misconduct for 
his failure to appear, violation of his duties to his client, the public, the profession, and the 
legal system, inconveniencing jurors and filing multiple recusal motions. R0138. OPC 
argued aggravating factors as follows: (1) Rasmussen's probation/stayed suspension from 
August 21, 2000, as a "pattern of misconduct;" however, such was dismissed and OPC could 
not evidence any actionable complaints filed with the Bar; (2) Rasmussen's refusal to 
acknowledge the wrongful conduct; and (3) Rasmussen's substantial experience in the law. 
R0142-144. OPC argued a lack of mitigating circumstances and requested a one-year 
suspension. R0144; R0146. Rasmussen filed his Sanctions Hearing Brief on May 28, 2010, 
arguing that a simple conference call could have resolved the plea agreement issues rather 
than Judge Anderson rejecting it, and that there was no potential/actual injury to Schriver, 
particularly given the later court acceptance of a substantively similar plea agreement and 
that Shriver was pleased with the representation. R0149-0151. 
The sanctions hearing was held June 1, 2010 and the Order of Sanction (the "Sanctions 
Order") was entered July 21, 2010, determining that Rasmussen knew the motion to recuse 
was denied, knew he could only file one, and yet filed a second one (the affidavit). R0160. 
The court found that Rasmussen (1) failed to appear because he would be forced to go to 
5 
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trial, violating his duty to his client, the profession, and the legal system; (2) burdened the 
legal system by filing two motions, expended judicial resources, and inconvenienced jurors; 
(3) acted knowingly; (4) caused harm to Schriver depriving him of counsel at trial and 
requiring him to appear multiple times to resolve it; (5) caused injury to the legal system, and 
(6) caused additional expenses. R0161-R0164. The court found aggravating factors of his 
prior dismissed discipline, failure to appear, pattern of misconduct, refusal to acknowledge 
wrongdoing, and substantial experience rising to suspension, with no mitigating 
circumstances existing. R0165-R0166, R0168. 
Rasmussen was suspended for one year (1) with all but 181 days of the suspension 
stayed, as follows: 
The Court will enter a suspension for one year in this matter but will stay all 
but 181 days. The Court is staying the imposition of the remaining time upon 
the following terms and conditions: 
1. That he enter and complete an ethics and professional conduct course 
by the end of the 181 day suspension. 
2. That he not practice law during the suspension and so certify that fact 
by affidavit. 
3. That he have no violations of the rules for one year from the date of 
this Order. 
4. That he will initiate a change in his office procedure whereby he 
personally communicates with the Court, its staff and opposing counsel 
and all such communication will be memorialized in his case file and will 
include the date, time and the named individual communicated with. 
Additionally, all changes of court dates must be followed by written 
communication to the Court. 
R0169. Rasmussen filed to amend the Sanctions Order to a reprimand. R0171. OPC 
opposed it arguing a lack of grounds to alter it to a public reprimand. R0185-0186. The 
court denied the amendment on October 22, 2010. R0195. 
On December 20, 2010, OPC informed Rasmussen (the "December Letter") of 
6 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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their knowledge that he had appeared before a court on December 17, 2010, telling him to 
cease and desist from the practice of law or be subject to an order to show cause. The 
December Letter stated his suspension was for six months and one (1) day subject to UT. 
LAWYER DISC. A N D DISAB.14-526. 
On January 24, 2011, Rasmussen filed his Verified Petition for Reinstatement of Thomas V. 
Rasmussen. ("Petition"), under UT. LAWYER DISC. AND DlSAB. Rules 14-525 and 14-526 
because of OPC's December Letter, indicating he had complied with the terms and 
conditions of the Sanctions Order and asking that he be reinstated. R204. Rasmussen also 
filed his Affidavit of Thomas V. Rasmussen ("Affidavit") on January 24, 2011, pursuant to UT. 
LAWYER DISC. AND DlSAB. 14-524, indicating that by entry of the order he will have not 
practiced law for 181 days under the Sanctions Order. R0207. On February 17, 2011, Judge 
Dever indicated he would sign the reinstatement order because OPC had not objected. 
R0212. On February 17, 2011 an Order of Reinstatement of Thomas V. Rasmussen 
("Reinstatement Order") was entered. R0213. 
On February 23, 2011, OPC filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Order of Reinstatement of 
Thomas V. Rasmussen ("Reinstatement Opposition"), arguing that the Reinstatement Order 
was premature under 14-525. R0215-R0218. On February 25, 2011 Rasmussen filed a Reply to 
Memorandum in Opposition to Order of Reinstatement of Thomas K Rasmussen ("Reinstatement 
Response") arguing that OPC's Reinstatement Opposition to the Affidavit was untimely 
under 14-524, the deadline having passed February 7, 2011. R0219-R0225. On February 25, 
2011 OPC filed it's The Office of Professional Conduct's Reply to Reply to Memorandum in Opposition 
to Order of Reinstatement of Thomas V. Rasmussen (the "Reinstatement Reply"), arguing in 
7 
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favor of applying 14-525 since the suspension was for six months and one (1) day and 
Rasmussen had filed the Petition under 14-525. R0217-0222. OPC argued the Affidavit was 
inconsistent with 14-524, was deceptive, and not in compliance with UT. R. ClV. P. 7. 
R0217-0222. 
On March 8, 2011, a hearing was held (the "Affirmation Hearing") regarding the 
Reinstatement Opposition. R0241. The court affirmed the Reinstatement Order. Id. On 
March 29, 2011 the court issued its Order ("Affirmation Order") affirming the 
Reinstatement Order, but indicating as follows: 
The Court will not set aside its Order of reinstatement dated February 17, 
2011. Thus, said Order will remain in full force and effect. However, the 
OPC may bring any information to the Court that it might have that Mr,. 
Rasmussen acted in violation of its Order of Sanction in this case dated July 
20,2010. 
R0263. 
On March 17, 2011 OPC filed its Motion for the Court to Consider Evidence of Thomas V. 
Rasmussen's Failure to Comply with its Sanctions Order and its Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
the Court to Consider Evidence of Thomas V. Rasmussen's Failure to Comply mth its Sanctions Order. 
(collectively, the "Post-Judgment Motion"), indicating the effective date of the Sanctions 
Order as August 19, 2010, with the Petition and Affidavit filed prematurely 158 days 
thereafter incorrecdy indicating Rasmussen had not practiced law for 181 days. R0245-
R0249. The Post-Judgment Motion argued Rasmussen had continued to practice law and 
had three dismissed bar complaints during his suspension, violating the Sanctions Order and 
warranting disbarment. R0250-0253. 
On April 21, 2011 Rasmussen responded by filing his Response to OPC's Motion for the 
8 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Court to Consider Evidence of Thomas V. Rasmussen's Failure to Comply with its Sanctions Order 
("Post-Judgment Response"), conceding to OPC's evidence of ongoing practice, stating 
that six (6) were withdrawals of counsel, twelve (12) were proceedings which he was winding 
up, and five (5) involved continuing matters until after he was reinstated. R270. 
On April 25, 2011 OPC filed its Reply to Memorandum in Support of Motion for the Court to 
Consider Evidence of Thomas V. Rasmussen ys Failure to Comply mth its Sanctions Order ("Post-
Judgment Reply"), arguing Rasmussen's concession. R0274-R0275. OPC sought 
disbarment based on a progressive discipline schematic. R0280. 
On May 16, 2011 Rasmussen responded to the Post-Judgment Reply further 
clarifying the cases OPC had listed ("Post-Judgment Response #2"). R0501. On May 18, 
2011, Rasmussen filed his Amended Response to OPC's Motion for the Court to Consider Evidence of 
Thomas V. Rasmussen's Failure to Comply To Its Sanctions Order (the "Supplemental Post-
Judgment Response"), raising a procedural challenge: to OPC's failure to timely file an 
objection to the Affidavit within ten days as required by 14-524, and arguing that OPC 
committed prosecutorial misconduct by submitting additional pre-reinstatement evidence 
after the Reinstatement Order even after entry of the Affirmation Order denying the 
Reinstatement Opposition. R0512-R0513, R0517. 
On July 19, 2011, the court entered its Order (the "Disbarment Order"), stating 
specifically as follows: 
Rasmussen argues that the Court is without authority to consider his violation 
of the suspension because the OPC did not file a notice of violation before he 
was reinstated. The Court does not find any merit to this claim. The 
suspension entered by the Court was for one year with all but 181 days 
suspended. There is nothing in the Rules that states that violations of the 
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suspension provisions can only be brought during the active period of the 
suspension. 
By his own admission, Rasmussen violated the terms and conditions of his 
suspension. He continued to handle cases and in fact accepted new clients 
during the period of suspension. 
Rasmussen violated the Order of the Court. His disregard of the Order brings 
into play Rule 14-606(a). A review of the factors outlined in Rule 14-604 
establish the following: First, there is no question that Rasmussen had a duty 
that was violated. The duty was complying with the Court Order. Second, his 
mental state was the stated need for money. Third, there was injury to the 
public and to the judicial system. A suspended attorney has no right to appear 
and represent individuals. Finally, there are no mitigating circumstances and 
the aggravating circumstances are clear. Rasmussen blatantly disregarded the 
Order of the Court for his own financial benefit. This violation was not a 
single episode but nearly two score. Rule 14-606(a) outlines the range of 
discipline for an attorney that violates a disciplinary order. The Court believes 
the appropriate sanction for violation of the suspension order is the next 
higher sanction. 
This Court finds that the appropriate sanction for violations committed by 
Rasmussen is DISBARRMENT. 
R0523-R0524 (emphasis in the original). 
On July 27, 2011, Rasmussen objected to the proposed findings, arguing against 
OPC's unsolicited presentation of a draft order. R0527. It was denied August 1, 2011. 
R0542. On July 27, 2011, Rasmussen filed to stay the Disbarment Order. R0529. The 
request was denied August 1, 2011. R0542. On July 27, 2011, Rasmussen filed his Notice of 
Appeal R0536. The Findings of Fact, Conclusions ofl^aiv, and Order of Disbarment^ was entered 
on August 1, 2011 (included in the defined term of "Disbarment Order" supra). R0544. 
10 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Affirmation Hearing March 8, 2011 
On March 8, 2011, the matter came for the Affirmation hearing on OPC's 
Reinstatement Opposition, as follows: 
OPC stated the issue as whether or not Rasmussen's reinstatement applied under 
either 14-524 as Rasmussen asserted for suspensions less than six months, or 14-525 as OPC 
asserted for suspensions over six months. R0558 at p. 2-3. Rasmussen referenced his 
Reinstatement Response and asked the court to sustain its Reinstatement Order, citing that 
"this has created a tremendous hardship on me and those that I love and care about" but 
acknowledging that he bore the responsibility and desired to "see if I can get back in the 
saddle and support my family as I have before." R0558 at pp. 3-4. 
OPC argued that the Sanctions Order stated Rasmussen's suspension as one year, 
invoking 14-525. R0558 at p. 4. OPC argued that Rasmussen's Petition was in line with 14-
525, but acknowledging that 14-524 only required an Affidavit to start practicing 
immediately. R0558 at pp. 4-5. OPC conceded the ten day objection deadline for the 
Affidavit under 14-524. R0558 at pp. 4-5. However, OPC argued the Petition under 14-525 
can be filed three months before the end of the suspension period, providing OPC sixty (60) 
days to object, and the court ninety (90) days to hold a hearing, with additional requirements 
under 14-525 outside the Sanctions Order, such as taking the "multi-professional 
responsibility thing.". R0558 at pp. 5-6. 
The court explained that it intended the suspension to be for six months and one (1) 
day, noting that it should not have used days in the Sanctions Order. R0558 at pp. 7-8. 
11 
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OPC argued the Affidavit was to be filed under 14-524 at the end of the 181 days, but 
Rasmussen filed it only 158 days after. R0558 at p. 8. OPC received the Reinstatement 
Order on the 181st day. Id. OPC argued there was "no reason why we would ever think 
that that was an affidavit consistent with 14-524, which would trigger a response on our 
part."R0558atpp. 8-9. 
OPC believed Rasmussen's actions were "totally consisistent" with 14-525; they 
proceeded accordingly by preparing a notice for the bar journal and serving discovery. 
R0558 at p. 9. OPC stated that they were doing their due diligence by checking their 
information, but believed Rasmussen had practiced during his suspension R0558 at p. 9. 
OPC argued that "[w]e need to make sure our evidence is solid, and that needs to be clarified 
before Mr. Rasmussen can begin practicing law..." R0558 at p. 9. OPC asked to set aside 
the Reinstatement Order and proceed under 14-525. R0558 at p. 10. OPC acknowledged a 
finding in Rasmussen's favor would negate the proceedings under 14-525 stating "[tjhere 
would be no need to answer our discovery." R0558 at p. 10. 
Rasmussen's understanding when he filed the Affidavit was that 14-524 allowed a 
ten-day objection period for OPC prior to the reinstatement being in effect, so he filed it in 
advance so the reinstatement could occur on the 181st day. R0558 at p. 11. Absent 
objection from OPC, Rasmussen believed the court capable of reinstating him. R0558 at p. 
12. Rasmussen also filed the Affidavit based on the Sanctions Order, which required that 
he undertake certain actions "by the end of the 181 day suspension." R0558 at p. 12. 
Rasmussen acknowledged he had "probably created a litde confusion" but that "[o]ut of an 
abundance of fear and caution" after receiving the December Letter, "not wanting to create 
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any confusion or unnecessary delay" he filed the Petition and an Affidavit and felt he had 
complied, albeit with "overkill." R0558 at pp. 12-13. 
The court questioned why Rasmussen thought 14-525 would not apply when the 
suspension had been for one year; he responded that the Sanctions Order only set forth 
conditions and referenced the end of 181 days. Tr. at p. 14. OPC argued Rasmussen was 
citing a subparagraph rather than the entire Sanctions Order, which was for one year upon 
which OPC relied. R0558 at p. 15. 
OPC claimed it sent the December Letter because they thought Rasmussen was 
practicing law, and as a courtesy. R0558 at p. 16. OPC denied any affirmative duty to 
inform Rasmussen about application of 14-526. R0558 at p. 16. OPC mistakenly thought 
Rasmussen was referencing his Petition as the Affidavit, apparently failing to acknowledge 
the filing of two separate documents. R0558 at p. 16. Upon this mistaken idea, OPC argued 
that if he had filed an affidavit, they would have objected to it as premature. R0558 at p. 16. 
The court questioned OPC whether the Sanctions Order should have included 
additional requirements if it fell under 14-525, to which OPC stated "he has to take the 
multi-state professional responsibility exam." R0558 at p. 17. OPC conceded that 
reinstatement under 14-524 is automatic upon filing the Affidavit and cannot be interpreted 
otherwise. R0558 at p. 17. 
OPC challenged the Affidavit as not meeting the requirements of 14-524, but stated 
that the Petition contained the necessary information for an Affidavit under 14-524. R0558 
at pp. 18-19. OPC argued that the Affidavit was premature and had no significance under 
the rules, but that OPC had focused on the Petition. R0558 at pp. 18-19. 
13 
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OPC argued the Sanctions Order did not list its effective date, but Rasmussen had 
located such under 14-526(a). R0558 at p. 19. OPC argued that specific reference to 14-525 
was not required since the one-year suspension fell under its provisions. R0558 at p. 19. 
OPC noted the Petition was filed "way early," so they did not respond to the Affidavit, but 
instead started their process under the Petition. R0558 at p. 20. OPC argued that a 
premature affidavit under 14-524 was a presumed "automatic objection" because the term 
had not expired, and it did not make sense to allow early filings under that rule. R0558 at p. 
20. 
Rasmussen clarified a separate Petition and Affidavit were filed, and he was not using 
the Petition as his Affidavit. R0558 at p. 21. Rasmussen filed the Affidavit under 14-524 and 
the Sanctions Order requirements. R0558 at p. 21. Rasmussen argued 14-524 did not 
prohibit early filings of an affidavit, stating that reinstatement could occur at the end of the 
suspension period. R0558 at pp. 21-22. Waiting to file the Affidavit would have required 
him to wait an additional ten days until reinstatement for OPC to object. R0558 at p. 22. 
Rasmussen argued that 14-524 simply states that the Affidavit had to be filed in anticipation 
of the end of suspension. R0558 at p. 22. 
The court questioned Rasmussen why he thought 14-524 applied when it had ordered 
one-year and stayed all but 181 days of it. Tr. at pp. 22-23. Rasmussen responded that, the 
preamble to the conditions stated the suspension as one-year, but the conditions all 
addressed only a 181-day period. Tr. at pp. 23-24. Rasmussen stated, "I thought the balance 
of the suspension which was not to be imposed was there as a — the same as in a criminal 
sentence and a jail sentence — was there to make sure that I did not have violations of the 
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rules for one year, and that I initiated certain communication practices with the Court." 
R0558atp.24. 
Rasmussen believed the actual suspension to be 181 days, but "was laboring under 
the fact that there was some suspended time that could come back to haunt me if I did not 
fulfill obligations No. 3 and 4 of the Court's order." R0558 at p. 24. He "was of the opinion 
that if [he] fulfilled obligations No. 1 and 2 of the Court's order, that the suspension would 
not exceed by any measure of time 181 days, the same as a jail sentence does not exceed 181 
days if that is the time of the commitment with the balance suspended." Id. The court 
articulated that it had intended that the suspension be for one year with a portion stayed, but 
absent clarity in the order the question was whether Rasmussen "is allowed to rely upon that, 
comply with what the Court said he had to do to be reinstated and file the necessary 
documents." R0558 at p. 25. 
The court ultimately determined it had not been clear in the Sanctions Order when it 
set the suspension at 181 days, particularly as to whether it was for less than or more than six 
months. R0558 at p. 27. The Reinstatement Order was affirmed as follows: 
The question is, is should the Court now set aside that order. Well, I think in 
the interest of fair play and equity, I don't think I can. I think that the Court 
made an error here, wasn't clear in its order. I said 181 days; 181 days passed, 
and Mr. Rasmussen submitted the order to the Court and the Court signed it. 
I think that if there's any problems with what he's done during the 181 days, 
certainly the OPC has the right to come back before the Court here and see if 
he violated the conditions of his suspension; and the Court then can entertain 
whether or not there should be another charge [sic] Mr. Rasmussen or an 
additional period of suspension ordered in this case. 
Id. 
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Morion Hearing May 19. 2011 
OPC presented evidence showing that Rasmussen practiced law after the effective 
date of his Sanctions Order. R0557 at p. 4. OPC argued against Rasmussen's reasoning that 
he was protecting clients by representing them, stating he should have protected them by 
finishing their cases and notifying them of his suspension. R0557 at p. 5. OPC argued there 
was no evidence that Rasmussen did anything to wind up his cases. R0557 at p. 7. OPC 
argued the Affirmation Order reinstated Rasmussen, but allowed OPC to present evidence 
of violations of the Sanctions Order. R0557 at p. 7. OPC argued they, "...accepted this 
order. We did not appeal it. Neither did Mr. Rasmussen." R0557 at p. 7. OPC argued that 
Rasmussen should be foreclosed from challenging procedural aspects of the case that were 
part of the Affirmation Order,. R0557 at p. 7. OPC then ironically reiterated its previously 
determined challenges to the Affirmation Order. R0557 at pp. 7-10. 
The court clarified the Motion Hearing pertained only to the "period of suspension, 
whatever the proper term should have been—and the Court noted that it should have said 
six months and a day, but it said 181 days— ... and based upon that error made by the Court, 
I allowed your reinstatement based upon the rule, further stating as follows: 
However, the issue that I allowed OPC to bring to me is whether or not 
during that six month period or those 181 day suspension that you violated 
the terms and conditions of the suspension order. That is that you practiced 
law during that period of time. That's the issues before the Court here today. 
R0557atp. 13. 
OPC requested that Rasmussen be disbarred under a progressive discipline schematic 
based upon failure to comply with the Sanctions Order and the bar complaints that were 
filed, basing its argument on this Court's Johnson case. R0557 at pp. 11-12. Rasmussen 
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argued die finality of die Reinstatement Order and Affirmation Order, widi 14-526(e) having 
required a determination of substantial compliance as a precondition to diat reinstatement. 
R0557 at p. 14. Rasmussen argued diat OPC had knowledge prior to die reinstatement as 
evidenced by dieir December Letter, but failed to present diat evidence timely. R0557 at pp. 
14-15. 
When the court asked Rasmussen how he could reasonably believe he could go to 
court on December 17, 2010, when he was suspended, Rasmussen admitted he should not 
have done so, acknowledging diat he made "errant judgment calls." R0557 at p. 15. The 
court tiien asked about new clients and entering appearances of counsel during die 
suspension, to which Rasmussen replied as follows: 
Well, I was going to lose my house. I was going to lose everything that I've 
worked 30 years for. I've had other attorneys come up to me after the fact 
and say, T3oy, if you'd have just asked we would have taken over your practice 
and helped you out.' 
Well, my mind doesn't think that way. I'm not scheming for ways to 
intentionally deceive; but Judge, this has been devastating to me. I have 
incurred over $100,000 in debt, used up my savings. I have a house that is 
almost paid that was at risk. I have the — kind of die infrastructure of a law 
practice I was desiring to return to and did return to that was at risk. 
I had a secretary whose husband has been at death's door that I was going to 
no longer be able to provide an income to. I had people that relied on me, my 
spouse and my children, that I had failed by being suspended. 
I was hoping not to lose everything in life, and I definitely, definitely, 
definitely curtailed my efforts except when it became life or death, if you will, 
in terms of my complete and utter financial ruin. 
Unlike — unlike somebody that may be suspended and loses a job, they may 
lose their income, but diey don't have a continuing cost of trying to keep 
some infrastructure in place. Unlike somebody diat's a part of a big firm diat 
may be suspended and others can absorb their workload, I was it. Not only 
did I have no one to absorb anything for me, and definitely I curtailed, I 
respect diis Court, I always have -
R0557 at pp. 15-16. The court did not believe Rasmussen curtailed his practice based on die 
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evidence. R0557 at p. 17. It noted that Rasmussen had filed the Affidavit, but was now 
telling the court it was incorrect. Id. Rasmussen replied that the affidavit was based on 
"substantial compliance" reiterating his belief that he had curtailed his practice. Id. 
Rasmussen argued he only did minimal "to try and stay alive" and "it was the difference 
between life and death in terms — from a business, from an economic standpoint" with hope 
that he had "substantially complied." R0557 at p. 17. 
Rasmussen provided his 14-524 Affidavit and believed OPC would have brought its 
objection. R0557 at pp. 17-18. The court indicated that it had authorized OPC in the 
Affirmation Order to bring its objections later and Rasmussen had not objected. R0557 at p. 
18. Rasmussen pointed out that regardless, OPC "was barred by statute of limitations, by 
estoppel, by waiver, by res judicata from bringing that up." R0557 at p. 18. The court asked 
for the rule creating a deadline to bring violations of the Sanctions Order before the Court, 
to which Rasmussen replied that 14-524 applied. R0557 at p. 18. 
Rasmussen argued that it was OPC own mistaken belief that caused them to overlook 
the ten-day deadline of 14-524. R0557 at p. 19. The court pointed out Rasmussen's 
mistaken filing of a 14-525 Petition, to which Rasmussen indicated it was based on OPC's 
December Letter referencing compliance with 14-526, which meant they thought 14-525 
applied. R0557 at p. 19. Rasmussen further pointed out that the court agreed that 181 days 
was less than six months, as memorialized in the Affirmation Order. R0557 at p. 19. 
The court sought clarification of Rasmussen's position as follows: 
You're saying that this ten days to file an objection is the ten days to bring to 
the Court any information that you violated the terms and conditions; and if 
you violated the terms and conditions that — and they don't catch it or see it, 
bring it to the Court's attention, it can't be done. Is that your position? 
18 
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R0557 at p. 20. Rasmussen stated, "I don't know why you would have a ten day cutoff or 
even a sixty day cutoff if these things were allowed to go on ad infinitum." R0557 at p. 20. 
Rasmussen cited 14-501 that the rules are "to be construed so as to achieve substantial 
justice and fairness" which is what he believed occurred at the Affirmation Hearing, further 
citing that, "[t]he interests of the public, the Courts and the legal profession all require that 
disciplinary proceedings in all levels be undertaken and construed to secure the just and 
speedy resolution of every complaint." R0557 at p. 21. 
Rasmussen argued that 14-524 au thored an objection to be filed within ten days to 
toll the reinstatement, with OPC automatically given a hearing on that objection. R0557 at 
p. 22. Rasmussen believed OPC was trying to use the Affirmation Order to circumvent their 
own shortcomings in not presenting their case within the time limitations of 14-524. R0557 
at p. 22. Rasmussen pointed out that OPC had not filed an order to show cause after the 
December Letter and had from December 20th to February 7th to investigate; however, they 
instead sought permission at the Affirmation Hearing after the fact to begin an investigation. 
R0557 at pp. 22-23. Rasmussen believed they relied on their mistaken interpretation that 14-
525 applied and failed to timely object. R0557 at p. 23. 
The court again sought clarification as follows: 
Your position is...that if you violated the terms and conditions of the 
suspension, and that if it was a less than six month suspension, and you filed 
an affidavit saying you hadn't practiced law and they didn't object, that they 
are barred now to bring any complaint against you or any action against you or 
any revisiting to this Court for your violation of tlie order to suspend? 
R0557 at p. 24. Rasmussen agreed and qualified this statement based on OPC's stipulation 
to the Reinstatement Order via phone with the court clerk. R0557 at p. 25. Rasmussen 
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argued that OPC was ignoring the very rules that they were to uphold. R0557 at pp. 25-26. 
Rasmussen articulated that OPC's argument under 14-525 failed since it invoked application 
of 14-526, which contained preconditions to reinstatement, and OPC had stipulated to 
reinstatement. R0557 at p. 26. 
OPC still argued that Rasmussen's suspension was for one-year and that the court 
intended it to be stayed for all but six (6)months and one (1) day. R0557 at p. 26. OPC 
reiterated its acceptance of the Affirmation Order, but argued that it was not entered under 
either 14-524 or 14-525, but simply resolved the reinstatement issue without doing so. 
R0557atp.27. 
OPC argued that Rasmussen had not stopped practicing law. R0557 at p. 27. OPC 
argued that the December Letter was simply an "inkling" that Rasmussen might be 
practicing, but the rule did not require them to send him anything; it was just a courtesy. 
R0557atpp.27-28. 
The court asked OPC to respond to the issue of the ten day objection deadline, and 
OPC conceded the answer was premised on a determination as to which rule applied. 
R0557 at p. 29. OPC argued the Affidavit did not meet 14-524 since it came only 158 days 
after the Sanctions Order. R0557 at p. 29,. OPC argued that they were not bound by the 
rule under a premature filing of the Affidavit when Rasmussen had not complied with any of 
the conditions. R0557 at p. 29. OPC argued that under 14-525 a suspended lawyer could 
file their petition three (3) months early, allowing OPC 60 days to respond and the court 90 
days to hold a hearing, with it all accomplished before the end of the suspension period. 
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R0557 at p. 30. However, OPC argued that an Affidavit cannot be filed early under 14-524. 
R0557 at p. 30. 
OPC again argued that Rasmussen's was a one year suspension and his actions were 
consistent with 14-525, but notes that, "that ship has pretty much sailed...because of the 
Court's [Affirmation Order]. We are here today to talk about whether or not he practiced 
while suspended, in violation of the Court's order." R0557 at p. 31. The court asked OPC to 
respond to Rasmussen's argument that they failed to object. R0557 at p. 32. OPC 
responded that "the Court handled that procedural aspect of it by its [Affirmation Order], 
and we stand by that, and we're happy with that portion of it." R0557 at p. 32. OPC 
acknowledged that the Affirmation Order allowed Rasmussen to practice. R0557 at p. 32. 
OPC argued the court never directed for inclusion in the Affirmation Order whether 
14-524 or 14-525 applied, indicating that the court did not have to reach that conclusion. 
R0557 at p. 33. OPC stated on the record, "[t]he Court reinstated Mr. Rasmussen. So 
procedurally that issue has settled. There is really no standing for Mr. Rasmussen at this 
point in time to even assert that issue." R0557 at p. 33. 
Rasmussen argued that 14-524 says nothing about when an affidavit can be filed, nor 
that it could only be filed after the period of suspension. R0557 at p. 34. Rasmussen argued 
that the Sanctions Order did not impose conditions contained in 14-526, that the 
Affirmation Order did not tell OPC "to what end that investigation would come" and that 
14-526 indicates that the investigation was a precondition to reinstatement. Id. 
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SUMMARY OF T H E ARGUMENT 
The court exercised excess jurisdiction in proceedings conducted in accordance with 
UT. LAWYER DISC. AND DlSAB. 14-524. On January 24, 2011, Rasmussen filed the requisite 
Affidavit under both 15-524 and the Sanctions Order. The court entered the Reinstatement 
Order on February 17, 2011, having received no objection but instead a stipulation to 
reinstatement from OPC's office. OPC opposed the Reinstatement Order on February 23, 
2011, and received a hearing on March 8, 2011. At the Affirmantion Hearing, OPC sought 
reversal of the Reinstatement Order by only arguing against application of 14-524. OPC 
only mentioned cursorily that it believed Rasmussen had violated the Santions Order, but 
presented no evidence and was ultimately found to have stipulated to Rasmussen's 
reinstatement by phone call with the court clerk. However, OPC requested that it be 
allowed to further investigate. The court entered the Affirmation Order, which OPC 
concedes concluded the reinstatement issue. 
The court exceeded its jurisdiction by authorizing OPC to bring further evidence in 
the future challenging the Reinstatement Order outside the parameters of 14-524, creating an 
indefinite period of time to do so. The court erroneously entertained OPC's Post-Judgment 
Motion, which OPC believed it filed only pursuant to the court's authorization. OPC 
brought the Post-Judgment Motion without reference to any particular rule of procedure 
allowing such. The result was disbarment on evidence that was both discoverable and 
discovered by OPC prior to the ten (10) day time frame of 14-524, but brought and 
presented nearly four (4) months after the filing of the Affidavit, and three (3) months after 
entry of the Reinstatement Order. 
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This Court has recently charged attorneys with adequately notifying the parties and 
the courts of the post-judgment rule under which they seek relief. OPC's Post-Judgment 
Motion did not reference a specific rule of procedure, but relied entirely on the court's 
authori2ation to present further evidence in the future. Reference to a particular rule was 
requisite to obtain relief since, as OPC conceded below, the Reinstatement Order and 
Affirmation Order both settled the question of reinstatement of Rasmussen and remained 
unappealed by the parties. 
Although OPC claims it did not seek reversal of the Affirmation Order by its Post-
Judgment Motion, it presented its same argument to apply 14-525, which was contradictory 
to the Affirmation Order. OPC additionally presented "new" evidence that it had not 
presented previously during the 14-524 proceedings that culimated in the Reinstatement 
Order and the subsequent Affirmation Order, but did not argue how it had been incapable 
of obtaining or presenting this evidence during those proceedings. The December Letter 
evidences that OPC had more than a month after receiving notice of evidence to investigate 
further before Rasmussen even filed his Affidavit, in addition to the ten days thereafter in 
which to object. 
OPC conceded it deliberately did not respond timely to the Affidavit because they 
thought it was premature, in insufficient form since 14-525 applied, and many other ever-
changing reasons, which they could have argued in a timely filed objection but did not. 
OPC's only objection came late in the form of the Reinstatement Opposition, which was an 
unspecified post-judgment motion having been filed after the Reinstatement Order was 
entered. The court denied that Reinstatement Opposition, at which point the Affirmation 
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Order concluded the post-judgment matters and was subject only to another properly raised 
issue on post-judgment motion or appeal. OPC failed to properly specify its Post-Judgment 
Motion, and did not properly meet any of the grounds for obtaining reversal of the 
Reinstatement Order or Affirmation Order. 
Alternatively, should this Court determine that the procedure was correctly 
undertaken by the court, Rasmussen had a right to rely on the Sanctions Order to dictate the 
sanction that should have been given him for violation of its conditions. Four (4) conditions 
were placed on Rasmussen in favor of staying all but 181 days of the one-year suspension. 
The Sanctions Order specifies that the remaining time of the one-year was suspended on 
those conditions; however, OPC wrongfully sought disbarment rather than a more 
appropriate lift of the stay under order to show cause proceedings. Rasmussen was placed 
on notice that he would be suspended for one-year if the four (4) conditions were not met, 
one of which specifically stated that he was to be able to attest to not having practiced law 
for 181 days. Upon determination of the violation of the condtions, the court should have 
lifted the stay and imposed the one-year sanction having put Rasmussen on notice that he 
was subjected to such. 
Alternatively, should this Court determine that progressive discipline was appropriate 
rather than a lifting of the stay contained in the Sanctions Order, the court failed to take into 
consideration the mitigating circumstances which would not have warranted disbarment. 
The court found no mitigating circumstances; however, Rasmussen provided sufficient 
information and was both humble and accepting of responsibility for his actions, repeatedly 
acknowledging his errant lack of judgment during the suspension period. Disbarment was 
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excessive when considering the mitigating circumstances, and should be revisited by this 
Court to determine a more appropriate sanction. 
ARGUMENT 
ISSUE I: Did the court exceed its jurisdiction in proceedings conducted under JjT. 
LAWYER DISC. AND DlSAB. 14-524 by entertaining OPC's objection to 
Rasmussen's reinstatement to the practice of law outside the scope of the ten-
day period of time contained therein} 
UT. LAWYER DISC. AND DlSAB. Rule 14-501 sets forth in pertinent part as follows: 
(c) .. .These rules shall be construed so as to achieve substantial justice and 
fairness in disciplinary matters with dispatch and at the least expense to all 
concerned parties. 
(d) The interests of the public, the courts, and the legal profession all 
require that disciplinary proceedings at all levels be undertaken and 
construed to secure the just and speedy resolution of every complaint. 
UT. LAWYER DISC. AND DISAB. 14-524 states as follows: 
Reinstatement following a suspension of six months or less. 
A respondent who has been suspended for six months or less pursuant to 
disciplinary proceedings shall be reinstated at the end of the period of 
suspension upon filing with the district court and serving upon OPC counsel 
an affidavit stating that the respondent has fully complied with the 
requirements of the suspension order ... Within ten days, OPC counsel may 
file an objection and thereafter the district court shall conduct a hearing. 
In Atwood v. Cox, this Court has held as follows: 
Certainly excess of jurisdiction is lack of jurisdiction in regard to that judicial 
action which exceeds jurisdiction. It would appear that excess of jurisdiction 
means a case in which the court has initially proceeded properly within its 
jurisdiction but steps out of the jurisdiction in the making of some order or in 
the doing of some judicial act. 
Ibid., 88 Utah 437, 55 P.2d 377, 384 (1936). Noncompliance with specific provisions of 
governing legislation or rules culminating in a judgment entered in excess of jurisdiction is 
void. See, e.g., State in Interest of Baby Girl Marie. 561 P.2d 1046,1047 (Utah 1977). 
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In In re Discipline of Oliver it states that, "[s]ubject-matter jurisdiction is 'authority 
to adjudicate the type of controversy involved in the action/" Ibid., 2011 UT 29,1f8, 254 P.3d 
181 (citation omitted). Furthermore, this Court stated that, "[pjleadings of some sort also 
are essential to invoke and confer jurisdiction of subject-matter of the action... [ijndeed, 
"[o]nce a court imposes a valid sentence, it loses subject matter jurisdiction over the case." 
Kramer v. Pixton.. 72 Utah 1, 268 P. 1029, 1034 (Utah 1928), citing State v. Montoya. 825 
P.2d 676, 679 (Utah Ct.App.1991). '"Without subject matter jurisdiction, a court is powerless 
to adjudicate a case." State v. Rhinehart. 2007 UT 61, |19 , 167 P.3d 1046; see United States 
v. Cotton. 535 U.S. 625, 630,122 S.Ct. 1781,152 L.Ed.2d 860 (2002). 
In the Supplemental Post-Judgment Response, Rasmussen first challenged that OPC 
had not timely objected to his reinstatement within ten (10) days of the filing of the Affidavit 
under 14-524. R0513. Rasmussen further argued that OPC committed prosecutorial 
misconduct by continuing to challenge the Reinstatement Order, when it asked the court to 
look into his pre-reinstatement activities even after the court entered its Affirmation Order. 
R0517. At the Affirmation Hearing, OPC conceded they had only ten (10) days to object to 
the Affidavit. R0558 at pp. 4-5. 
At the Affirmation Hearing, Rasmussen explained when he filed the Affidvit he 
believed 14-524 allowed a ten (10) day objection period for OPC prior to the reinstatement 
being in effect, so he filed the Affidavit in advance to allow that process to take place so the 
reinstatement could occur at the 181 day mark. R0558 at p. 11. Upon no objection from 
OPC, Rasmussen believed the Court capable of executing an order of reinstatement to 
finalize the proceedings. R0558 at p. 12. 
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At the Affirmation Hearing, the court stated as follows: 
The question is, is should the Court now set aside that order. Well, I think in 
the interest of fair play and equity, I don't think I can. I think that the Court 
made an error here, wasn't clear in its order. I said 181 days; 181 days passed, 
and Mr. Rasmussen submitted the order to the Court and the Court signed it. 
I think that if there's any problems with what he's done during the 181 days, 
certainly the OPC has the right to come back before the Court here and see if 
he violated the conditions of his suspension; and the Court then can entertain 
whether or not there should be another charge [sic] Mr. Rasmussen or an 
additional period of suspension ordered in this case. 
R0558 at p. 27. The Affirmation Order memorialized the oral determination as follows: 
The Court will not set aside its Order of reinstatement dated February 17, 
2011. Thus, said Order will remain in full force and effect. However, the 
OPC may bring any information to the Court that it might have that Mr. 
Rasmussen acted in violation of its Order of Sanction in this case dated July 
20, 2010. 
R0263. 
While there was much discussion among the parties and court below as to an 
interpretation of 14-524, the plain language speaks for itself. A respondent sha/Ibe reinstated 
at the end of the suspension period upon filing the requisite affidavit, and OPC counsel may 
file an objection "[wjithin ten days" of receipt of the affidavit, and "thereafter the district 
court ^ / / conduc t a hearing." 14-524 (emphasis added). The Affidavit was filed January 24, 
2011, and the ten (10) day period ran February 7, 2011; the Reinstatement Order was entered 
February 17, 2011, on the 181st day after the effective date of the Sanctions Order. OPC's 
only objection came on February 23, 2011. Whether an objection under 14-524 or post-
judgment in nature does not matter. The court afforded OPC its hearing under either on 
March 8, 2011, at which time OPC only argued that 14-525 should apply, mentioning that it 
believed it had evidence that Rasmussen had violated the Sanctions Order, but failing to 
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present that evidence. OPC sought to present the evidence at a future hearing after the court 
affirmed the Reinstatement Order consistent with 14-524. 
OPC points out that the court never required reference in the Affirmation Order to 
14-524 or 14-525; however, OPC believed it was unnecessary since the court resolved the 
reinstatement issue and allowed it to come back with further evidence. While this was a 
procedural anomaly in that the Affirmation Order could be read as applying both 14-524 and 
14-525, presuming the regularity of such order it is clear that only 14-524 could apply since 
numerous provisions under 14-525 had not been satisfied as requisite preconditions to 
reinstatement as required by 14-526. Additionally, the Sanctions Order itself only required 
an affidavit, invoking application of 14-524 and not addressing any further requirements 
under 14-525 or 14-526. 
Neither 14-524 nor 14-525 authorizes reinstatement with further hearings conducted 
thereafter to challenge such. The court initially proceeded properly within its jurisdiction 
under 14-524, but stepped outside of its jurisdiction in rendering that portion of the 
Affirmation Order that allowed further presentation of evidence after finality of the 14-524 
proceedings, unless such language can be construed as nothing more than allowing a proper 
post-judgment motion to be filed, as more specifically addressed below. Atwood at 384. 14-
524 does not specifically disallow hearings post-reinstatement; however, it must be read in 
conjunction with Rule 14-501 requiring that, "disciplinary proceedings at all levels be 
undertaken and construed to secure the just and speedy resolution of every complaint." It 
was neither "just" nor "speedy" for the court to both affirm Rasmussen's reinstatement in a 
final order and authorize open-ended further proceedings to challenge it. 
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The court exercised an excess of jurisdiction by entering a final order and then 
authorizing relitigation in the future, as addressed more particularly below. Without subject 
matter jurisdiction properly invoked post-judgment, the court was powerless to adjudicate 
the disbarment in this matter. See, Rhinehart at ^19; Cotton. 535 U.S. at 630,122 S.Ct. 1781. 
Noncompliance with 14-524 culminated in the Disbarment Order entered in excess of 
jurisdiction. See, e.g., Baby Girl Marie at 1047. This Court should reverse the Disbarment 
Order as void having been entered in excess of jurisdiction. Id. 
ISSUE II: Did the court abuse its discretion in relitigating Rasmussen's 
reinstatement or, alternatively, in granting OPCpost-judgment relief from 
the Reinstatement Order when both OPC's objection and subsequent motion 
failed to adequately articulate or support the requests under applicable 
provisions of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedures? 
A. THE DISBARMENT PROCEEDINGS WERE BARRED BY THE 
DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA 
In State in Interest of J.J.T.. the Utah Court of Appeals undertook an analysis of the 
doctrine of res judicata as follows: 
The doctrine of res judicata ... has evolved from common law jurisprudence 
to serve such public interests as "fostering reliance on prior adjudication," 
"preventing inconsistent decisions," "relieving parties of the cost and vexation 
of multiple lawsuits," and "conserving judicial resources." Office of Recovery 
Servs. v. V.G.R, 845 P.2d 944, 946 (Utah App.1992) (citing Allen v. McCurry, 
449 U.S. 90, 94,101 S.Ct. 411,415, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980)). 
Res judicata has two related but distinct branches, both of which are intended 
to promote judicial economy and the convenience afforded by finality in legal 
controversies. Copper State Thrift & luoan v. Bruno, 735 P.2d 387, 389 (Utah 
App.1987). One branch, claim preclusion, or "pure" res judicata, bars, inter 
alia, the relitigation of claims which have been previously litigated between the 
same parties. Id. To invoke this branch of res judicata, three requirements 
must be satisfied: 
First, both cases must involve the same parties or their privies. Second, the 
claim that is alleged to be barred must have been presented in the first suit or 
must be one that could and should have been raised in the first action. Third, 
the first suit must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits. 
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Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 1988). The other branch, issue 
preclusion, traditionally known as collateral estoppel, prevents relitigation of 
issues that have been decided, though the causes of action or claims for relief 
are not the same. Penrod v. Nu Creation Creme, Inc., 669 P.2d 873, 875 (Utah 
1983); Copper State, 735 P.2d at 389. 
Ibid., 877 P.2d 161, 162-63 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). In Church v. Meadow Springs Ranch 
Corp., Inc. it states, "[t]he final adjudication of a claim for relief is binding on the parties and 
their privies and precludes a subsequent adjudication of the same claim." Ibid., 659 P.2d 
1045, 1048 (Utah 1983)(citations omitted). "Res judicata bars not only the relitigation of 
claims which have been once adjudicated but also claims which should have been 
adjudicated in the initial proceeding but were not." Id. (citations omitted). In Bradshaw v. 
Kershaw, it states as follows: 
When a second claim, demand or cause of action is essentially the same as a 
prior claim, demand or cause of action which has gone to final judgment, res 
judicata means that neither of the parties can "again litigate that claim, demand 
or cause of action or any issue, point or part thereof which he could have but 
failed to litigate in the former action." 
Ibid, 627 P.2d 528, 531 (Utah 1981), quoting Wheadon v. Pearson. 14 Utah 2d 45, 46, 376 
P.2d 946, 947 (1962). "Clearly, if an issue is actually raised by proper pleadings and treated 
as an issue in a case, it is conclusively determined by the first judgment." Macris & 
Associates. Inc. v. Neways. Inc.. 2000 UT 93, |40,16 P.3d 1214. 
At the Affirmation Hearing, OPC stated that "we think that there has been the 
practice of law during the course o f - during the course of his suspension period." R0558 at 
p. 9. OPC argued "[w]e need to make sure our evidence is solid, and that needs to be 
clarified before Mr. Rasmussen can begin practicing law..." R0558 at p. 9. OPC asked the 
court to set aside the Reinstatement Order and proceed under 14-525. R0558 at p. 10. OPC 
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also acknowledged that a finding by the court in Rasmussen's favor would negate the 
proceedings under 14-525. R0558 at p. 10. 
A comparison of the transcripts from the Affirmation Hearing and the Motion 
Hearing indicate that OPC intended to relitigate the matters from the Affirmation Hearing at 
the latter, although conceding that Rasmussen's reinstatement had been concluded in the 
Affirmation Hearing. OPC argued at the Motion Hearing that, "the OPC accepted this 
[Affirmation] order. We did not appeal it. Neither did Mr. Rasmussen." R0557 at pp. 7, 32. 
OPC argued that "the Court handled that procedural aspect of [the reinstatement] by its 
[Affirmation Order], and we stand by that, and we're happy with that portion of it." R0557 
at p. 32. 
Rasmussen argued that the reinstatement was the: finality of the proceedings and that 
14-526(e) required a determination of substantial compliance as a precondition to that 
reinstatement. R0557 at p. 14. Rasmussen argued that, "while [OPC] had asked for the 
Court's permission to continue to investigate, the fact of the matter was is that [it] was 
barred by statute of limitations, by estoppel, by waiver, by res judicata from bringing that 
up." R0557 at p. 18. Rasmussen pointed out that OPC had stipulated to his reinstatement 
by phone call with the court clerk prior to the Reinstatement Order. R0557 at p. 25. Its 
Post-Judgment Motion was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. 
First, both the Affirmation Hearing and the Motion Hearing involved the same 
parties. J.J.T. at 163. Second, OPC's claim that Rasmussen violated the Sanctions Order was 
presented in the Affirmation Hearing when OPC informed the court that they believed he 
had violated his suspension. R0558 at pp. 9-10; J.J.T. at 163. OPC failed to present its 
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evidence, asking that it be allowed to do so in the future under proceedings under 14-525. 
Id. However, under these 14-524 proceedings, OPC could and should have raised such 
evidence by timely objection to the Affidavit or in that Affirmation Hearing, but did not. 
JJT\atl63. 
Third, as OPC concedes repeatedly, the Affirmation Hearing resulted in a final 
determination of Rasmussen's reinstatement. J J .T . at 163. OPC told the court more than 
once how neither they nor Rasmussen appealed that order and that it concluded the 
reinstatement proceedings. R0557 at pp. 7 and 32. OPC went so far as to say that they were 
"happy" with that decision. Id. 
However, the Disbarment Order evidences that the time frame during which the 
reinstatement was considered to be sustainable is the exact time frame containing evidence 
argued by OPC for disbarment. OPC sought disbarment on evidence predating the final 
order of reinstatement in this matter. The court and OPC relied only upon an portion of the 
Affirmation Order for support to hold the Motion Hearing at all—all while ignoring the 
preconditions to reinstatement mandated under 14-526(e); however, a court is without 
discretion or authorization to relitigate matters that have previously been fully litigated. 
Rasmussen had a right to rely on the Reinstatement Order and subsequent 
Affirmation Order as the finality of that suspension period and for those orders to be 
binding upon the court and the parties. Church at 1048. When the Post-Judgment Motion 
was brought by OPC, it raised items it could have but failed to present before reinstatement. 
The prior matter—Reinstatement Opposition—had gone to final judgment; hence, "res 
judicata means that neither of the parties can 'again litigate that claim, demand or cause of 
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action or any issue, point or part thereof which he could have but failed to litigate in the 
former action/" Bradshaw at 531 (internal citation omitted). The court should not have 
entertained the Post-Judgment Motion brought by OPC, regardless of its erroneous 
authorization to do so in the Affirmation Order. 
B. THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING POST-JUDGMENT RELIEF TO 
OPC FROM RASMUSSEN'S REINSTATEMENT. 
UT. R. CIV. P. 59 states as follows: 
Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be granted to all or any 
of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of the following causes; 
provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an action tried without 
a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been entered, take 
additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of law or make 
new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new judgment: ... 
(a)(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the 
application, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered 
and produced at the trial. ... (b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial 
shall be served not later than 10 days after the entry of the judgment. 
Furthermore, UT. R. ClV. P. 60 discusses post-judgement motions as follows: 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; 
fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the 
furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final 
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: ... (2) newly 
discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in 
time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); ... 
Under Workers Comp. Fund v. Argonaut Ins. Co.. this Court determined that parties 
cannot file post-judgment motions without reference to the specific rule of procedure under 
which relief is sought and leave the task to the court to construe the motion within the rules. 
Ibid., 2011 UT 61, f 11, 266 P.3d 792, 795-97, reh'g denied (Dec. 8, 2011), citing Gillett v. 
Price, 2006 UT 24, fflf 7-8,135 P.3d 861. "Argonaut's motion was not captioned as a rule 59 
motion, it did not cite to rule 59 or any other authority to show that Argonaut was entitled 
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to relief from judgment, nor was its motion accompanied by a supporting memorandum, as 
required by our rules." Argonaut at f^ 12. "In our system, the rules provide the source of 
available relief. They are designed to provide a pattern of regularity of procedure which the 
parties and the courts can follow and rely upon." Gillett at % 8. "[A] movant's failure to 
specify the rule governing the motion is unfairly prejudicial to the opposing party, whose 
task in preparing a response to the motion is made more difficult." Argonaut at f^ 13. "It 
should be Argonaut's burden, not the burden of the district court or opposing counsel, to 
identify the rule under which it seeks relief from judgment." Id. Argonaut's motion "was 
neither captioned as a rule 60(b) motion nor did it cite to rule 60 or any other authority... [it] 
did not reference any of the circumstances enumerated in rule 60(b) as justifying relief from 
judgment... [and] the district court did not address rule 60(b) in its order denying Argonaut's 
motion." Id. at % 14. This Court "refuse[d] to construe Argonaut's 'objection to judgment' as 
a rule 60(b) motion." Id. 
Under Robinson v. Baggett. the Utah Court of Appeals has stated that, "[a]s a general 
rule, parties should allege all known grounds for relief in one motion for relief from 
judgment..." Jfe^.,2011 UT App 250,123, 263 P.3d 411. 
...[t]here must be finality, a time when the case in the court is really 
over and the loser must appeal or give up. Successive post-judgment 
motions interfere with that policy. And justice is not served by 
permitting the losing party to siring out his attack on the judgment 
over a period of months, one argument at a time, or to make the first 
motion a rehearsal for the real thing the next month. 
Id., citing Arnica Mutual Insurance Co. v. Schettier. 768 P.2d 950, 969 (Utah App.1989) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). Schetder's second post-judgment motion for relief was 
barred by " law of the case' because the 'newly discovered evidence' he asserted as the 
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ground for relief under his second motion cwas available ... at the time he filed his first ... 
motion and with due diligence could have been included in the original motion,..." Id, citing 
Schettier. The Robinson court determined that a party may not file repeated post-judgment 
motions "until he either offers a meritorious ground for relief or exhausts himself and the 
court in an effort to do so." Id. 
In the instant matter, the Reinstatement Order was entered, the Reinstatement 
Opposition was filed by OPC and heard, and an Affirmation Order was entered affirming 
Rasmussen's reinstatement to the practice of law. The Reinstatement Opposition was 
articulated as filed pursuant to 14-525, which did not apply under the court's Affirmation 
Order. See, R0215-0218. Thus, Rasmussen considered it filed as a post-judgment challenge 
to the Reinstatement Order. 
The oral and written determination by the court at the Affirmation Hearing indicated 
that OPC "may bring any information to the Court that it might have that Mr. Rasmussen 
acted in violation of its Order of Sanction" and "certainly the OPC has the right to come 
back before the Court here and see if he violated the conditions of his suspension; and the 
Court then can entertain whether or not there should be another charge [sic] Mr. Rasmussen 
or an additional period of suspension ordered in this case." R0558 at p. 27, R 0263. The 
Affirmation Order affirmed the Reinstatement Order and all parties and the court agreed 
that it was the finality of those proceedings. Thus, this language author ing the presentation 
of further evidence after entry of the final order can only be construed as post-judgment in 
nature. 
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The Post-Judgment Motion was filed by OPC only on the basis of the language of 
the Affirmation Order rather than pursuant to any applicable rules of civil procedures. 
Thus, Rasmussen approached it in the nature of post-judgment proceedings, challenging that 
the matter could not be relitigated and that OPC had maintained the ability to present the 
evidence in the prior Affirmation Hearing that it now sought to present in post-judgment 
proceedings. The court ultimately granted OPC post-judgment relief by entering the 
Disbarment Order. 
UT. R. ClV. P. 59 authorises a court, upon evidence of the grounds stated therein, to 
"open the judgment if one has been entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of 
fact and conclusions of law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a 
new judgment:..." Under subsection (a)(4), the rule affords this relief on showing of 
"[njewly discovered evidence, material for the party making the application, which he could 
not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial." UT. R. ClV. P. 
60(b)(2) also provides for relief from an order upon a showing of "newly discovered 
evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new 
trial under Rule 59(b)." 
Contrary to the dictated requirements of this Court, OPC did not file its Post-
Judgment Motion under any specific provision of these rules. Argonaut at fflf 11-15. Similar 
to Argonaut. OPC's motion was not captioned as a rule 59 motion, it did not cite to rule 59 
or any other authority to show that it was entitled to relief from the Reinstatement Order or 
Affirmation Order as required by the rules. Id. at f 12. OPC's "failure to specify the rule 
governing the motion is unfairly prejudicial" to Rasmussen, whose task in responding to and 
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now appealing the erroneous grant of such motion has been made more difficult. Id. at ^113. 
OPC made its challenges to the Reinstatement Order through its Reinstatement 
Opposition, which was also post-judgment in nature. As stated in Robinson, supra, "[tjhere 
must be finality" and "[successive post-judgment motions interfere with that policy." Ibid. 
at [^ 23, citing Shettler at 969. "Q]ustice is not served by permitting the losing party to string 
out his attack on the judgment over a period of months, one argument at a time, or to make 
the first motion a rehearsal for the real thing the next month." Id. The court's procedure 
undertaken below in entertaining the Post-Judgment Motion did just that. 
OPC was allowed to bring its first challenge under the Reinstatement Opposition that 
14-525 should apply to defeat the Reinstatement Order, mentioning that it had evidence that 
Rasmussen had violated the Sanctions Order but failing to present that evidence. OPC was 
then erroneously authorized to bring additional evidence, post-judgment, by the court in 
subsequent proceedings even though it affirmed Rasmussen's reinstatement and finalized the 
matter. The court then allowed the evidence, although it did not meet the criteria of "newly 
discovered," and entered the Disbarment Order. 
Similar to Robinson, the court should have denied OPC's second Post-Judgment 
Motion as barred by " law of the case' " because the "newly discovered evidence" asserted 
as the ground for relief "was available ... at the time [OPC] filed [their] first [post-judgment] 
motion and with due diligence could have been included in the original motion." Ibid, at \ 
23. Absent a meritorious ground for relief under the applicable post-judgment rules, 
repeated motions for relief from a final order should not be entertained. Id. 
The court abused its discretion in granting OPC relief under its improperly filed and 
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unsupported Post-Judgment Motion. Having entered the Disbarment Order as a result, 
such order should be reversed. 
ISSUE III: Alternatively if the procedure below is sustained by this Court, did 
Rasmussen have a right to rely on his sanction being in the form of the 
court lifting the stay and imposing the one-year suspension? 
UT. R. ClV. P. 7(f)(1) states that, "[a]n order includes every direction of the court, 
including a minute order entered in writing, not included in a judgment." Under In re 
Discipline of Crawley, this Court stated as follows: 
\ 24 In Crawley's case, we find that the district court appropriately exercised 
its discretion and uphold the sanction it imposed: a one-year stayed 
suspension with eighteen months of probation subject to a multitude of 
conditions. We also uphold the (district courts sanction with respect to 
Henderson and, in doing so, express the following concern. In In re Doncouseu 
we stated that "[t]o serve as an effective deterrent for further misconduct, the 
penalty for violating an order of suspension must be more severe than the 
original suspension."15 Henderson's misconduct occurred, in part, while he 
was serving a two-year suspension, with all but six months of that suspension 
stayed. Although Henderson's sanction in this matter should be more severe 
than the stayed suspension that he violated, we decline to impose a more 
severe sanction now because the OPC did not appeal on this issue. We thus 
uphold the sanction imposed by the district court of a one-year suspension 
with leave to petition the court for probation. But we put the bar and bench 
on notice that less severe terms of suspension and probation are inappropriate 
sanctions for an attorney who violates the terms of an existing suspension or 
probation. 
Ibid., 2007 UT 44, f 24,164 P.3d 1232. 
In the instant matter, the court entered the Sanctions Order specifically determining 
as follows: 
The Court will enter a suspension for one year in this matter but will stay all 
but 181 days. The Court is staying the imposition of the remaining time upon 
the following terms and conditions: 
5. That he enter and complete an ethics and professional conduct course 
by the end of the 181 day suspension. 
38 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6. That he not practice law during the suspension and so certify that fact 
by affidavit. 
7. That he have no violations of the rules for one year from the date of 
this Order. 
8. That he will initiate a change in his office procedure whereby he 
personally communicates with the Court, its staff and opposing counsel 
and all such communication will be memorialized in his case file and will 
include the date, time and the named individual communicated with. 
Additionally, all changes of court dates must be followed by written 
communication to the Court. 
R0169. 
Similar to the Crawley case, supra,, the court herein opted to stay a portion of 
Rasmussen's suspension on certain conditions. However, unlike Crawley, OPC did not file 
an OSC on violations to pursue a lift of that stay. Instead, the matter was erroneously heard 
for disbarment under Post-Judgment Motion after Rasmussen had already been reinstated. 
Having done so, the Post-Judgment Motion maintained the benefit of both attaching itself 
to the prior proceeding for progressiveness, but yet also seeking relief outside those prior 
proceedings. 
If the Post-Judgment Motion was in fact an extension of the suspension proceedings 
for the Sanctions Order as OPC and the court believed, then the proper sanction to 
implement for violation of the Sanctions Order was a lifting of the stay and imposition 
of.the one-year suspension. Rasmussen reasonably believed that this was the sanction to 
which he was subjected if he violated such Sanctions Order. 
At the Affirmation Hearing, Rasmussen stated that he believed the actual period of 
suspension to be 181 days, but that he was at risk for a one-year suspension if he failed to 
fulfill the conditions of the Sanctions Order. R0558 at p. 24. The court similarly stated that 
"when I entered this order, the suspension in this case, it was my intention that the 
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suspension be for one year and I was staying all but the time ... [s]o the question now comes 
down to ... whether or not Mr. Rasmussen is allowed to rely upon that, . . ." R0558 at p. 25. 
The OPC also acknowledged the stay in Motion Hearing that ".. .February 16th [w]as the 181 
days when the stay would have been up, . . ." R0557 at p. 5. 
OPC failed to seek an OSC against Rasmussen to lift the stay on the Sanctions Order, 
as it warned in its December Letter, instead seeking an excessive order of disbarment. The 
court erroneously allowed OPC to circumvent appropriate procedure in this matter by 
obtaining Rasmussen's disbarment on unarticulated and unsupported post-judgment filings 
when the sanction was appropriately set forth in the Sanctions Order. Rasmussen had the 
right to rely on the contents of the Sanctions Order, and the sanction in this matter should 
have been a one-year suspension as noticed to Rasmussen therein. 
ISSUE IV: Alternatively, did the court err in concluding that disbarment was the 
presumptively correct form of discipline and in failing to account for 
mitigating circumstances? 
A. THE COURT ERRED IN APPLYING RULE 14-606 RATHER 
THAN UNDERTAKING AN ANALYSIS UNDER RULE 14-605. 
UT. LAWYER DISC. AND DlSAB. Rule 14-509 states that, "[i]t shall be a ground for 
discipline for a lawyer to: ... (b) willfully violate a valid order of a court or a screening panel 
imposing discipline." Under the Rule 14-605 disbarment is appropriate under the following 
circumstances: Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer: 
(a) Disbarment. Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer: 
(a)(1) knowingly engages in professional misconduct as defined in Rule 8.4(a), 
(d), (e), or (f) of the Rules of Professional Conduct with the intent to benefit the 
lawyer or another or to deceive the court, and causes serious or potentially serious 
injury to a party, the public, or the legal system, or causes serious or potentially 
serious interference with a legal proceeding; ... 
Rule 14-606 states as follows: 
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Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon application of the 
factors set out in Rule 14-604, the following principles generally apply in cases 
involving prior discipline. 
(a) The district court or Supreme Court may impose further sanctions upon a 
lawyer who violates the terms of a prior disciplinaiy order. 
(b) When a lawyer engages in misconduct similar to that for which the lawyer 
has previously been disciplined, the appropriate sanction will generally be one 
level more severe than the sanction the lawyer previously received, provided 
that the harm requisite for the higher sanction is present. 
The Sanctions Order states that Rasmussen violated his duty by not appearing at the 
trial, burdening the public and the legal system by filing two motions to recuse the trial 
judge, expended judicial resources and inconvenienced jurors. R0161. The Disbarment 
Order states that Rasmussen violated the terms and conditions of his suspension, implicating 
Rule 14-606(a). R0524. 
The court in this matter presumed that disbarment was the presumptively correct 
sanction, applying progressive discipline under Rule 14-606(a). However, for an escalation 
in severity to be appropriate under this rule, the additional conduct is required to be "similar 
to that for which the lawyer has previously been disciplined." Rule 14-606(b). However, the 
Sanctions Order and the Disbarment Order evidence that the conduct was not similar in 
nature. 
The initial Sanctions Order was based upon the failure to appear at trial and the filing 
of successive motions to recuse. These actions differ from practicing law while suspended. 
The plain language of Rule 14-606(b) does not support the court's presumptive escalation of 
the discipline level. Instead, the matter was more appropriate to an application of Rule 14-
605, which would have required a careful examination as to intent and whether any injury 
resulted from the conduct. 
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OPC presented no evidence to show how Rasmussen's behavior resulted in any 
injury, with the court only presumptively finding in this regard that "[a] suspended attorney 
has no right to appear and represent individuals." R0524. The court viewed Rasmussen's 
explanation as to why he had undertaken the conduct at issue—concern for supporting his 
family and the livelihoods of those employed by him—as his "own financial benefit" and 
"need for money." R0524. Rasmussen, however, had informed the court that he had 
incurred over $100,000 in debt, depleted his own personal savings, and was simply trying to 
maintain the infrastructure of his nearly 30 year sole-practitioner business, doing as little as 
possible to accomplish that. If indeed Rasmussen had been disregarding the Sanctions 
Order the entire time in favor of making money, he would not have incurred the debt nor 
depleted his own savings but rather continued practicing as usual. Rasmusen took 
responsibility for his actions in this matter, and voiced his concern for those whom he had 
let down, including his family and employees. 
Although the concept of 30 appearances and 14 filings by Rasmussen in the six (6) 
month period seems voluminous, it is not presumptively evident of a complete disregard for 
the Sanctions Order. A closer look indicates that the majority of the items presented by the 
OPC were very minor matters, although concededly still considered the practice of law from 
which Rasmussen was suspended. From the information submitted by OPC at R0284-
R0489, the appearances include eleven (11) for scheduling purposes, two (2) for withdrawal, 
three (3) for prosecutor dismissals, four (4) for continuances, two (2) motion hearings, three 
(3) entries of pleas, four (4) sentencings, and one (1) trial on a Class C misdemeanor case. 
The pleadings filed were nine (9) standard appearance forms, and five (5) motions. 
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Rasmussen conceded each of these in open court, but explained that his representations 
were deliberately minimal in attempt to substantially comply with the Sanctions Order; 
nonetheless, he fully conceded at the Disbarment Hearing that, in hindsight, he made some 
errant judgment calls in all of these representations during his suspension. Rasmussen also 
indicated he refrained from the practice of law after receiving OPC's December Letter of 
warning until his reinstatement. 
An analysis under Rule 14-605 rather than application of Rule 14-606 would show 
that Rasmussen was not intentionally trying to deceive, and reasonably believed he was 
substantially complying with the Sanctions Order. Although it became clear to him that he 
was not in compliance, he did not try to minimize his responsibility. An analysis under Rule 
14-605 would have favored a more severe sanction than was previously afforded, but not 
severe enough to support disbarment. In In re Discipline of Doncouse. this Court has 
stated, "[w]e do not administer the sanction of disbarment lightly; we understand its 
devastating effects on an attorney." Ibid., 2004 UT 77, ^ [16, 99 P.3d 837 (citations omitted). 
Should this Court determine in the instant matter that the procedures undertaken 
below were appropriate under 14-524, the Disbarment Order nonetheless was excessive in 
that the application of Rule 14-606 to the proceedings was error. The discipline imposed 
should not have been under the progressive discipline schematic, but rather under Rule 14-
605 for imposition of sanctions in a matter substantially differing from the prior actions 
leading to the Sanctions Order. 
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B. THE COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING MITIGATING 
CIRCUMSTANCES. 
UT. LAWYER DISC. AND DlSAB. Rule 14-607 states in pertinent part as follows: 
After misconduct has been established, aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances may be considered and weighed in deciding what sanction to 
impose. 
(b) Mitigating circumstances. Mitigating circumstances are any considerations 
or factors that may justify a reduction in the degree of discipline to be 
imposed. Mitigating circumstances may include: (b)(1) absence of a prior 
record of discipline; (b)(2) absence of a dishonest or selfish motive; (b)(3) 
personal or emotional problems; ... (b)(5) full and free disclosure to the client 
or the disciplinary authority prior to the discovery of any misconduct or 
cooperative attitude toward proceedings; ... (b)(7) good character or 
reputation; ... (b)(10) unreasonable delay in disciplinary proceedings, provided 
that the respondent did not substantially contribute to the delay and provided 
further that the respondent has demonstrated prejudice resulting from the 
delay; (b)(ll) interim reform in circumstances not involving mental disability 
or impairment; (b)(12) imposition of other penalties or sanctions; (b)(13) 
remorse; and (b)(14) remoteness of prior offenses. 
The Disbarment Order specifically found that, "there are no mitigating circumstances 
and the aggravating circumstances are clear. Rasmussen blatantly disregarded the Order of 
the Court for his own financial benefit This violation was not a single episode, but nearly 
two score." R0524. The court considered Rasmussen's articulated need for money to keep 
his family and business afloat as an aggravating factor demonstrative of a selfish motive; 
however, this was in fact a mitigating circumstance and should have been considered under 
Rule 14-607(b)(3) as a "personal or emotional problem/' 
Rasmussen articulated his desire for continuity of representation for some of these 
clients as a way of helping them. Rasmussen also articulated his concern for having let down 
his family and employees and wanting to ease the impact of his errant judgments on them. 
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Rule 14-607(b)(2) allows evidence ol the "absence or a .... seiiisn 
circumstance, which should have been considered at a minimum as an offset to the 
aggravating effects of what the court concluded was Rasmussen's selfish desire of his "own 
financial benefit" under Rule 14-607(a) (2). R0524. The court failed to give due weight to 
potentially mitigating circumstances and found aggravating circumstances where it should 
not have. 
Other mitigating factors were also applicable to this matter. Under Rule 14-607 (b)(1), 
the absence of a prior record of discipline applied in that Rasmussen had a 29-year career 
with a virtually clean record of conduct but for the Sanctions Order and subsequent 
Disbarment Order in these proceedings. Pursuant to Rule 14-607(b)(5), Rasmussen took full 
responsibility and freely disclosed his conduct to the court, maintaining a cooperative 
attitude toward the proceedings. If Ramsussen is denied relief under Arguments I and II, 
supra, OPC's delay in presentation of its evidence would be a mitigating factor under Rule 
14-607 (b) (10), particularly where Rasmussen was prejudiced as a result in reasonably 
believing the Reinstatement Order and/or Affirmation Order was the conclusion of such 
proceedings. Pursuant to Rule 14-607(b)(11), there was an interim reform on Rasmussen's 
part upon receiving the December Letter to cease and desist from OPC, having then realized 
the error in his judgment. Under 14-607(b) (12) Rasmussen paid $2000 in sanctions. 
Rasmussen relayed much remorse on the record for his actions, which supports the factor 
contained in Rule 14-607 (b) (13). 
The court failed to consider any of these mitigating circumstances, erroneously 
finding instead that there existed none. It considered some factors aggravating that should 
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have instead been considered mitigating under Rule 14-607. Considering these factors in 
cases that have previously been before this Court, disbarment was an excessive sanction. 
CONCLUSION 
WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing, Rasmussen respectfully requests that this 
Court grant him the relief which he requests and any further relief that this Court deems 
appropriate in this matter. 
DATED this 4th day of June, 2012. 
QtLnn, V fU**-^^, 
Thomas V. Rasmussen 
Pro se Appellant 
RULE 24ffl(l)(C) CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE 
Appellant herein certifies that this brief is in compliance with the limitations 
contained in UT. R. APR P. 24(f)(1) in that it contains 14,000 words and 1,194 lines of text, as 
evidenced by use of a MicroSoft Word 2007 system. 
Thomas V. Rasmussen 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
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Addendum "A" 
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Billy L. Walker, #3358 
Senior Counsel 
Utah State Bar 
Office of Professional Conduct 
645 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801)531-9110 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the 
Discipline of: 
Thomas V. Rasmussen, #02693 
Respondent 
\ FINDING OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF 
| LAW, AND ORDER OF DISBARMENT 
| Civil No. 09090S841 
| Judge L A. Dever 
This matter came before the Court upon for hearing on the request of the Utah 
State Bar Office of Professional Conduct (OPC) for the Court to consider evidence of 
Thomas V. Rasmussen's (Rasmussen) Failure to Comply with the Sanction Order 
issued by the Court on July 21, 2010. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
A Sanction Order was issued by this Court on July 21, 2010. The Order provided 
that Rasmussen was suspended for one year with all but 181 days suspended. 
Pursuant to Rule 14-526{a), the effective date was 30 days later on August 20, 2010. 
The 30 day period provided by the Rule is to altow Rasmussen the time to wind down 
his practice and cease representing clients. 
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The evidence presented by the OPC establishes that Rasmussen continued to 
practice beyond the August 20th deadline. Additionally, no evidence was presented that 
Rasmussen complied with the requirement that he obtain consent from his clients to 
wind down after giving full disclosure of the Court's Order. 
The evidence established that during the period of suspension Rasmussen made 
36 appearances in 17 courts. The evidence establishes that there were eleven cases 
where Rasmussen entered an appearance on the case after the effective date of his 
suspension (Robledo (2), Clarke, Smoot, Thangaraj, Willis, Poole, Gibson, Tait, 
Webster, and Robertson). The evidence presented by the OPC itemizes nine cases 
where he appeared where charges were not even filed against his clients until after the 
effective date of his suspension (Robledo, Wiersma (2), Thangaraj, Willis, Poole, 
Gibson, Tait, Webster). This alone establishes he was taking on new matters during his 
suspension. 
Rasmussen filed with the Court an affidavit stating that during the period of 
suspension he had not practiced law. The evidence establishes that the affidavit was 
not truthful. 
Rasmussen stated in Court on May 19, 2011, that he violated the suspension 
Order. His position was that because he needed money he had to violate the Order and 
practice law. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Rasmussen argues that the Court is without authority to consider his violation of 
the suspension because the OPC did not file a notice of violation before he was 
reinstated. The Court does not find any merit to this daim. The suspension entered by 
the Court was for one year with all but 181 days suspended. There is nothing in the 
Rules that states that violations of the suspension provisions can only be brought during 
the active period of the suspension. 
By his own admission, Rasmussen violated the terms and conditions of his 
suspension. He continued to handle cases and in fact accepted new clients during the 
period of suspension. 
Rasmussen violated the Order of the Court. His disregard of the Order brings into 
play Rule 14-606{a). A review of the factors outlined in Rule 14-604 establish the 
following: First, there is no question that Rasmussen had a duty that was violated. The 
duty was complying with the Court Order. Second, his mental state was the stated need 
for money. Third, there was injury to the public and to the judicial system. A suspended 
attorney has no right to appear and represent individuals. Finally, there are no mitigating 
circumstances and the aggravating circumstances are dear. Rasmussen blatantly 
disregarded the Order of the Court for his own financial benefit. This violation was not a 
single episode but nearly two score. Rule 14-606(a) outlines the range of discipline for 
an attorney that violates a disciplinary order. The Court believes the appropriate 
sanction for violation of the suspension order is the next higher sanction. 
3 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The Court finds that the appropriate sanction for violations committed by 
Rasmussen is DISBARMENT. 
ORDER 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Thomas V. Rasmussen be disbarred 
effective 30 days from the date of this Order, pursuant to Rule 14-526(a) of the Rules of 
Lawyer Discipline and Disability. Mr. Rasmussen shall comply with all requirements of 
Rule 14-526 of the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT during the period of disbarment, Mr. 
Rasmussen is hereby enjoined and prohibited from practicing law in the State of Utah, 
holding himself out as an attomey at law, performing any legal services for others, 
giving legal advice to others, accepting any fee directly or indirectly for rendering legal 
services as an attomey, appearing as counsel or in any representative capacity in any 
proceeding in any Utah court or before any Utah administrative body as an attorney 
(whether state, county, municipal, or other), or holding himself out to others or using his 
name in any manner in conjunction with the words "Attorney at Law", "Counselor at 
Law", or "Lawyer." 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mr. Rasmussen is to reimburse to the Utah 
State Bar Fund for Client Protection for any money that the Fund pays based upon its 
rules. 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT to be readmitted to the practice of law from 
this Order, Mr. Rasmussen must fully comply with the provisions of Rule 14-525 of the 
Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability. 
Entered this *P day 01 .2011. 
Third Judicial District Judge 
5 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 28th day of July, 2011,1 mailed via United States mail, 
first-class postage pre-paid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing proposed 
FINDINGS OF FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER OF DISBARMENT to: 
Thomas V. Rasmussen 
4659 South Highland Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Respondent 
MsrtM?k 
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Billy L. Walker, #3358 
Senior Counsel 
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Utah State Bar 
645 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801)531-9110 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the 
Discipline of: 
Thomas V. Rasmussen, #2693 
Respondent. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Civil No. 090908841 
Judge LA Dever 
I hereby certify that on the 2nd day of April, 2011,1 caused to be mailed via United 
States first class mail, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the FINDING OF 
FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER OF DISBARMENT in the above matter 
to Thomas V. Rasmussen, 4659 South Highland Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah 84117. 
DATED this %- day of August, 2011. 
Billyt WalkeM 
Senior Counsel 
Office of Professional Conduct 
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THOMAS V. RASMOSSEN, #2693 
4659 So. Highland Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Telephone: (801) 484-3000 
Facsimile: (801) 273-1089 
BvJ£-
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the 
Discipline of: 
Thomas V, Rasmussen, #2693 
VERIFIED PETITION FOR 
REINSTATEMENT OF 
THOMAS V. RASMUSSEN 
Civil No. 090908841 
Judge: L. A. Dever 
COMES NOW RESPONDENT, Thomas V. Rasmussen, and hereby requests 
this Court to reinstate him as an Attorney at Law in good standing, 
in the State of Utah. This request is based on Respondent's 
compliance with the terms and conditions of the Court's Order of 
Sanction, dated July 20, 2010. 
The Court and the OPC should be made aware that, during the 
course of Respondent's suspension and the attendant hardships 
brought on by said suspension, Respondent has had many quiet 
opportunities to be intraspective about his suspension. I would 
like everyone to know that I take full ownership and accountability 
for every decision I made that resulted in the consequence of my 
being suspended. I do not blame any person, other than myself, for 
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my predicament; and I do not feel like a victim of the judicial 
system- I believe that most people bring adverse consequences upon 
themselves because of their own choices in life. After all, life 
is one continuing lesson in cause and effect. My decisions have 
created actual or potential harm not only to the judicial system 
but to people for which I have a responsibility to care (e.g., 
clients, my secretary, and my family) . During the last six months, 
as sole practitioner, I have been devastated financially, having 
had to cash in fully my only 401 (k) plan, with the 10% penalty for 
early withdrawal, and having to deplete my savings down to a sum of 
$10.00, the amount required to keep my account open. Additionally, 
I have had to borrow a substantial amount on my Home Equity Line of 
Credit. All of the above actions have been done in an effort to 
not lose my home and to meet my on going financial obligations at 
my law office. Most, if not all, of my law office obligations 
exceed six months in duration, so I have had to pay for my 
respective obligations as they came due (e.g. , advertising, bar 
dues, CLE, phone lines, secretary, etc.). 
Please reinstate me at the earliest possible time, as I am 
running out of resources to sustain my office and my family. 
Again, I bear absolutely no ill will toward anybody for my 
suspension and believe that by taking a full accounting of my 
decisions I have grown as a person and as a lawyer. 
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DATED this Z.n day of January, 2011. ^ 
rnrrr\Utl\ C* T T ^ J T} "A CTUTTTC? C? 1 THOMAS V. RASMUSSEN 
Respondent 
VERIFICATION AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
That personally appeared before me THOIiIAS V. RASMQSSEN, who 
has stated to me that the above-stated facts are based upon his 
personal knowledge and are truthful. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 2±fck/ daY o f January, 
2011f bL\*T\\c\\\as> V PL*Siv\u<^c^\. 
Notary Public 
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Affidavit of Thomas V. Rasmussen, 
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THOMAS V. RASMUSSEN, #2693 
4659 So. Highland Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Telephone: (801) 484-3000 
Facsimile: (801) 273-1089 
sy—4) 
Dsp^ry Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the 
Discipline of: 
Thomas V. Rasmussen, #2693 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
THOMAS V. RASMUSSEN 
Civil No. 090908841 
Judge: L. A. Dever 
ss. 
State of Utah 
County of Salt Lake 
COMES NOW THOMAS V, RASMUSSEN, the undersigned affiant, having 
been first duly sworn upon oath, and deposes and states as follows: 
1. The undersigned affiant is a resident of Holladay, Utah, 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
2. I have personal knowledge of all facts and circumstances 
set forth below, and would testify to the same if called upon to do 
so. 
3. I am an Attorney at Law licensed to practice in the State 
of Utah. 
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4. On July 20, 2010, Judge L. A. Dever of the Third Judicial 
District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, suspended me for 
181 days. 
5. I have not practiced law for a total of 181 days up to the 
time of my anticipated reinstatement in this matter, 
DATED this ?tff day of January, 2011. 
THOMAS V. RASMUSSEN 
Affiant 
VERIFICATION AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
That personally appeared before me THOMAS V. RASMUSSEN, who 
has stated to me that the above-stated facts are based upon his 
personal knowledge and are truthful. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 24fh , day of January, 
2011
 f V»t\ Ti\o*\\^  V (Isv^mU^Suv 
Notary Public 
*/4SSb 
i|(jBiit 1 ^jy^^^y 
^*±**?*Jr 
Notary Public 
AH SA WEBB 
Commission #600496 
My Commission Expires 
August 30.20U 
Stale of Utah 
X)nl<> 
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Certificate of Attendance 
® 
I hereby certify that I attended the following course approved by the Utah State Board of 
Continuing Legal Education. 
2/T\j— 
Signature of Attendee 
Course: OPC Ethics School: What they Didn't Teach you in Law 
School 
Date: January 19, 2011 
Location: Utah Law & Justice Center 
CLE: 6 Hrs. ethics (incl. 1 professionalism/civility credit) 
Please RETAIN this certificate for your records! 
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JAN 2 8 #11 
Daputv C*erk 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
VERIFIED PETITION FOR REINSTATEMENT OF THOMAS V. RASMUSSEN, 
accompanying AFFIDAVIT OF THOMAS V. RASMUSSEN and a CERTIFICATE OF 
ATTENDANCE TO OPC ETHICS SCHOOL, were hand delivered to the Office 
of Professional Conduct at 645 South 200 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111. 
Dated this day of January, 2011. 
Thomas V. Rasmussen 
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Order of Reinstatement of Thomas V. Rasmussen, 
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SALT: 
THOMAS V. RASMUSSEN, #2693 
4659 So. Highland Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Telephone: (801) 484-3000 
Facsimile: (801) 273-1089 
CST 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
In the Hatter of the 
Discipline of: 
ORDER OF REINSTATEMENT OF 
THOMAS V. RASMUSSEN 
Thomas V. Rasmus sen, #2693 Civil No,. 090908841 
Judge: L. A- Dever 
Based upon Respondent's Verified Petition for Reinstatement 
and accompanying documentation, and the fact that more than 181 
days from the effective date of the Court's Order of Sanctions, 
dated July 20, 2010, has elapsed, and for good cause appearing, it 
is hereby; 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, & DECREED, that Thomas V. Rasmussen, #2693, 
is hereby Reinstated as an Attorney at Law in good standing in the 
State of Utah. 
DATED this day of February, 2011. 
BY|TBE COURT: 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed postage pre-paid a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Order of Reinstatement of Thomas V* 
Rasmussen to the Office of Professional Conduct at 645 South 200 
East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111* 
Dated this JT day of February, 2011. 
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( 
Billy L. Walker, #3358 
Senior Counsel 
Diane Akiyama, #7125 
Assistant Counsel 
Utah State Bar 
Office of Professional Conduct 
645 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801)531-9110 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the 
Discipline of: 
Thomas V. Rasmussen, #02693 
Respondent. 
I ORDER 
| Civil No. 090908841 
) Judge L A. Dever 
The above entitled matter is before the Court for hearing on the Utah State Bar's 
Office of Professional Conduct's ("OPC"), Memorandum in Opposition to the 
Reinstatement of Thomas V. Rasmussen filed to contest an Order of Reinstatement 
signed by the Court on February 17, 2011. Billy L Walker appeared on behalf of the 
OPC. The Respondent, Thomas Rasmussen appeared accompanied by counsel, 
James Deans. In addition to reviewing the submissions of the parties regarding the 
February 17, 2011 order, the Court heard oral argument. Therefore, being duly advised 
in the premises, the Court makes the following ruling: 
FitfD DISTRICT COURT 
Third judicial District 
MAR 3 o 201! 
Deputy Clark 
aua 
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The Court will not set aside its Order of reinstatement dated February 17, 2011. 
Thus, said Order will remain in full force and effect. However, the OPC may bring any 
information to the Court that it might have that Mr. Rasmussen acted in violation of its 
Order of Sanction in this case dated July 20, 2010. 
Entered this ** day of ,2011. 
BY THE COURT: 
Third Judicial District Judge ^ 1 
# 
2 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that mi \Uv- W h day nl Mured, :>\r\ I H I I i r W °' > 
mail, first-class postage pre-paid, a true and correct copy >' the foregoing prop* 
ORDER to: 
James H. Deans 
440 South 700 East #101 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Cuunst'l lot Respondent 
lAlkft (Alfckt 
3 
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jut ? m 
XH THE DISTRICT COOTT OF THE U B S ) JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
./ • 1JNI A.NL) W i 
T. mi w .i-i.-i^.
 0f i h c,i nii.rinlii^ -~1:s ORDER OJr SAHCTIOK 
T S G M ^ v RA3H5S3EN, l u ^ b ^ J CXSS HO,. 090908841 
Respondeat. * Judge 1*. ^ - Dever 
This matter'was before the Court on the Matter of the Discipline 
of Thomas V Rasmussen. The Court previously found i.hat the 
respondent had vioiat ^ i • L« :^ .,!t.. - ~: ;HS.- ,*„.' c-,_duv"i 8^4(a) and 
8 4{d* The Office <>i Professiondl Conauct .^Pi - *«-o represented by 
Diane Akiyama. The respondent was present and represented by James .H. 
,H ctfib *'h.€' ou * .:d^  i ;.• ~M+Z 1*2*2 nrn\ ':< tMyx ->-%-* i m c ...: .i . xc^iing 
circussstances, finds and concludes as follows: 
PREI*TMTNAPV' ST&TEMEHT 
The Standards for imposing ^dwyei Sanctions of the Supreme Court 
Rules at Professional Practice (*StandardsH: -n<> tte framework of 
rules us*~ni b\. r*--f- s . • * * -P^M-^ ,,: -v* r :_, . ,it . .. ? * : : x^: 
categorit-b ot auscoruiuc^ ••"iit Standards explain that : 
[t]he purpose of imposing lawyer sanctions is \ *, ensure <nid 
maintain the high standard .of professional conduct required 
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R&5MIJ5SBN MATTER PAGE 2 ORDER 
of those who undertake the discharge of professional 
responsibilities as lawyers and to protect the .-public ami 
the administration of justice from lawyers who have 
demonstrated by their conduct that they are unable or likely 
to be unable to discharge properly their professional 
responsibilities. 
Pursuant co the Standards * [aj disciplinary sanction is isposea 
on a lawyer upon a f"Indinq ^ r acknowledgment * -.-M * h. ..-,-• * *<? , 
engage." : ,,-r^tei».-. ^*. . jusconauct a Ru.*t- L4-603\a)i, Standards-
Factors a Court should insider in iinposj-ng a sa-uctxon are: w(a; 
the -h:? v violate , * sjeutal state; (c^  the potential or 
actual injury causec i;y the lawyer's misconduct; id) jad the existence 
3f aggravating 01 mitigating factors.- ku . e 4 *--i • . awards :ne 
5tan*1^ » i- ;,
 :r-. *,1 esumptive appropriate sanctions,, absent 
aggravating or mitigating circumstances. See Rule 14 6 05 Standards. 
Pursuant to the Standards, . Vv.-f -u>XiU:^ »:.• w >L; a he the 
iH-^ '^ '* •<* (<:'ebUinp:ive sanction, then considers and weighs .-" 
ggxavating and mitigating circumstances to decide wfc. -^....-i •. 
mpose Moa-exhaus- *v, ,Hi i| these tactors are set toitn m the 
tcindards. See .Rule 14-607, Standards. Aggravating rs rcumstances are 
actors that 'might justify an increase in, 1 he : scipi ue iisposed; • • 
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BASMOSSEN M&TTER PAGE 3 .."' •.., •' •-' Q R ^ * 
mitigating circumstances are those that might justify a decrease in. 
"the discipline imposed Sep, Id.
 ;... . ." . . "•'•'• . - ..••••.••-'[ 
FHBDIH6S OF FACT 
.'"'••'" Based, on. the Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions; of .Law that 
were entered an Apri II *s >*.*' "*« *Irea«' • ound the . , 
following facts; 
1 Mr- Rasamssen xs an attorney licensed in Lhe State of Utah 
and a nieiaber of the Utah State Bar. 
2 According to Utan State Bar records, Mr. kasrcussen has been 
a. meaa^T f" * *-*»-*!. 
1 lue Co£*pJLaiL>; wcis . * ieo o n b e h a l f o f t h e T?tah S t a t e B a r ' s 
Officii oi Professional Conduct as directed by the Ethics and 
: : x x p i : l(*sm- <-<• : -u *\«n vapremt1 _ourt? and is based upon an 
Informal Cosipiaint; submitted against Mi Rasmussen by the OPC. 
4 roe OPC v ••-,- . . * r
 t :nn? - . snip.: a i :u *b : 
Rassmssen on October ^ 
5 A Screening Panel of the Ethi-r and Discipline Committee of 
the- Utah ^ -n^-^m*- -*;*•* ^f.r .-. <- ^^unc: -^ ;9-
€ ,^ r che conc lus ion or t h e h e a r i n g on March s . >009, t h e 
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}:A:>MUiSfc.v MATTEL ?^GE 4 ' •; '^  ' 
s e reenina Panel directed the OPC to file a" formal Complaint against 
Mi l i d S l & a i S S e n . 
7 -Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant- «-o Ruie .4-
iip ,iM. .!? w , • Professional Practice, Rules of Lawyer 
Discipline and Disability ~ 
8 ¥enue is proper in this Court pursuant to Rule 14-511(b), 
Rules of Lawyer Uiscipi mv and Disability n.i thdt, at ail relevant 
times, Mr, Rasmnssen resided or practiced law in Salt Lake County. . ;. 
9 Mr. Kastaussen served as a defense counsel in the case of 
State of Utah v. John Schriver in the Seveiilh Distrnrii Court, nfi San 
Juan County* • • "%; ' ^ - • 
, <~ .*.«.,, ^ tr ^ .sr^r apr-eared. in court .with his. 
client tor the airraxgnment hearing. 
On'August ?o, 200^ -it the arraignment hearing, the Court 
•-? * i " J .-: J UaU.J [J rvu^ f.aii^ e ?. '•.'•"' 
i- At the arraignment, nearing on August ?r 2007, the Court, 
informed Mr. Rassaissen that the jury would be -sussspned on October 2$,~ 
2007, and that plea bargains "would not be accepted., after that date, 
except on a showing' of why the agreement could riot nave been,,, arranged 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
•M.SMTTSSF.N MATTER " ^AGE 5. ' ^ ± X I " K 
pj-ior to that time - - . . 
1"* Da October 26', 200 l
 { Mr Rasmussen h ad s< aie d :1 scussions -w. I th 
tbe prosecution about a possible plea agreement:. 
•-r*. s ••**-. - rT-ar:< nded Mr. Rasmussen o£ the: Court's r;'_ / 
-—tractions diui cautioned that any plea would be canditi'Onecl, upon. 
rJie Court's willingness to depart from its rule-
•it- b^iuw.i .j.:,-nvjK =.i.x. ,-st / ;\.t Mr 'Eassmssen 
would need to confer with the Court, so the part Les. could 'Obtain' the-
Court's .-.rproval via a telephone conference. .' 
2 6 ''On, October 29, 2007, Mr, 'Rasmussen sent to'the prosecutor a 
letter reciting the plea agreement. ' 
' ^r- - " ! !r Rasmussen' s. of f I ce faxed: the 1 ettei: 
reciting the piea agreement to the Court,. • • 
w
" Rasmus sen did not file a Motion, a written,,., request for a 
t.-iit-jijuj = wy comerei}Cpf or' other written, request that the .Court 
consider the plea agreement letter. ' . 
19 Burxnc the w e e k of Or:tii«- ••-'•- r- -^ . izn^n *jdq«- — 
traveling between Px±ce Moafc, Jedar c,iy ana SL . v^orge, Utah. 
The judge was informed by the court clerK that the letter 
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RASMOSSEN MATTER PAGE' € . ; . ORP&R 
had teen received and the judge indicated that he would try re review 
'the letter, and fi ] e on November 5 200 3 • . - • 
21 ML tvasmusseu-s start called the prosecutor during the week 
of October 29, :>r>07 
22. *• < *uu^ t>tr:. -«vt*; per t>orici ty itrempcec ' o contact. Zh& 
prosecution during the week oi October 2^ 
23 Thf? nrosecutor ' •-" ^ ^smussen -'.*; - • r-+* fleeced 
t.o be a conterence with th« .^ouii x~egarding the plea proposal. 
24 Mr. Rasmus sen dzd not submit- any witter request rox ex 
conference regarding the plea proposal i,o Uie Clouxt . • .-•••• ' ' '•'" 7, 
.' 25 Mr . Sasiaussen did not contact the Court and request to 
schedule a. ennf&retnc^ '" 
26 & -^niussen-s stJLZL did not contact the Court and request 
to.'Schedule .-. ccjcf erence. "'••.•-
27 On November f '007. the-judge rev iewed t :„1 i„e 1 etter,- and,, • • • 
issued an Order rejecting" the, plea agreement • • ': 
28 Mr. Rasnmssen filed a Motion to Recuse the . issi gzied judge ti „ 
November . 
. 29 ; - Motion to Recuse was referred to Judge Johansen on 
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Novembei 200?., 
. w^-Hftr*" • • ' .--i- « - > ^ e d Mr, Rasmus-sen1's-
recusal Motion. 
. 33 ' Mr. Rasaoissen faxed a Supplemental. Affidavit of Bias-in..; "-
Support < >f Moti ex f 7*-. » *- /< ;i >S/ : Recoas-i dez .to -the Coort a 
•-.' around 4:42 p a;, on Novembex *r <>0G>?. 
i^ Mr. Rasmussen filed the Supplemental Affidavit of Bias in 
Support of Motion to Recuse and a Motion to Reconsider ev-n uaougn 
s^ ile 19 ;c) ri) (cj restricts a party from filing "more than one Motion of 
Recusal'. • . •' ' " .';"• • -
A* *"he sanctions hearing, the following .facts were established.: • 
l - Mr. Rassussen had knowledge; that the Motion co Recuse had 
been denied. ' ' ' .; ' *'.:"• 
34 Mr, Rasmusseo. admitted that ...he:.knew;.,only one Motion to;.'._.. 
Recuse was allowed and yet he proceeded to file the Motxon to • 
Reconsider. ' ' -
35 Mr. .Rasmussen failed to appear ar the criminal trial .knowing" 
full wei thr.- . • .;. ,-
 k .. i;r^;.: , •. ; ;s< \ v was wait ing 
1* ML Rasmussen stated he did not appear because he was 'afraid 
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RASMUSSEN MATTER PAGE 8 UHDU 
the judge would force him to ao to trial . 
APPLICATION F FHE FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED SM 1MP0SXHG SAHCTIOl^ 
Dx3oipi2.ne :s not based solely on t-he nature r»f the underlying 
rule violations Thus after a tindinq of lawyer rusconduct the* 
Standard irr»v^ if >... •. * '^ t • *ori:- ••!«=• * * w :g fciCtOIS 
?r imposing -t sanction: ~^i) ; ne duty violated; (b) the lawyer's'"- "\ 
mental state; (c) the potential n^- actuaX-injury-caiised by'-'the? 
**.'-»* - Si.o:-:,, ..
 t existence of aggrat<- -:. r:ig or ' 
mitigating factors.* Rule L4-6G4, Standards, 
1. Tins.. Duty Violated ' 
Mr Rasmussen violated his duty to his client, the public, the 
profession and the legal system M: Rasmus sen violated hir -iutv LO 
his client K *t. • ^r^r
 ri. ., iir_ . 4 _ ^ _ ..ati(i t ^ L i n ^jg 
Court's instruction. M? Hasmussen burdened the public and the legal 
systeis when he filed two Motions to. Recuse the t rial jurlqf-, forced the 
Court I.. "xi>eiid j utiie xai resources' because of his. nonappearance and 
multiple Motions, and inconvenienced jurors who 'were sunaaoned to 'the 
court when the trial did not orrx-eed 
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2. The Lawyer1 .* Mentor ^f^t- .' • • 
A lawyer's aienta. ui.n* :ete. *• = -;ni" 
awareness - intent, knowledge &n£ negligence Uta^-s Standards define 
these• as follows 
^Intent" is the conscious 'obj.ectiW.or'purpose. to accomplish • 
a particular result.. 
^Knowledge* is the conscious asiareness of the nature or 
attendant circumstances of the conduct hut *ri.thont the 
conscious objective or purpose to accos^lish a particular 
result. 
Standards, Rule "M - * 
it- Lourt gave x. ^smussen the cut of i aaie in * tie toun o 
entertain a plea agreement two months in advance. MI Rasmnssen faxed 
the <\ot i ,'nr.- * h>* t £*« iu «-^ *-TT»-M! -w" .- ' . <r jn^ .iy - n*-
Affcer tnt Court rejected the plea agreciifcn M; Rcii-iauisset filed two 
Motions to Recuse despite Rule 26(c) {1} (c), which only permitted the 
filing < >f one z e - f - * • .* *s< > The second i e< :usa3 ,. Motion w = , 
filed just prior to the end or the woridjog • day-.before, the'trial. Mr. v 
Rasmussen acted., Tauntingly when he ..disobeyed -.the Court's instruction -
a
 n^ the p rocedural rules governing, the court, proceedings. 
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BftSMOSSEN MATTER P A G E i 0 
,. - The Potential or Actual Lujuxy C-UBWI hV "»' T * « Y « J « Misconduct 
The Standards provide that: ,• 
-injury- is harm to a client, Lh<= puDnc, the legal system. 
or tlie profession which results from a lawyer's 
misconduct. -Potential injury- is the harm to a ciieiu. 
the public, the legal system or tlie profession that is 
reasonably foreseeable at'the tine of the lawyer's 
misconduct, and which, but for soaie intervening factor or 
event, would probably have resulted "from' the" lawyer'"s 
misconduct.' 
Standards, Rule 14-6-1, DefmiLions. 
M- Rasmussen' s misconduct caused injury to Mr ~<?hriver by not 
; j t-oii ;uy i--i. . . ..- r— -r* resulted in having Mi. 
Schriver to appear without counsej .ai . lit? i ime of trial, tnereby 
increasing his anxiety ab well as causina Mr Schriver to make 
additional appearances in court as a resu., - : -*: *at>jUi«sse;. s 
conduct Mr. Rasmussen's misconduct also caused injury \,o the 
reputal; ion of hr profess I on . . ..... • 
Mr. Rasmus sen - s delsJaerate nonappearance and filing of two. 
Motions to Recuse also- caused injury to r.he legal system, M 
Rasmus sea's misconduct h-n t u du «>..« .- :, _ _* ^ a view 
the second Motion, the empanelnient of the iury whar. the trial could 
not go forward, and an additional hearing where Mr._ Rasmussen did not 
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appear, ail of «hich inconvenienced the citizens and caused expense to 
the State that would not have been necessary without Mr. Rastmissen's 
actions. 
4 Tl a ! Existence i :irf Aggravating or Mitigating Factors 
Finally, there aire numerous and substantial aggrav ating facte) i •=; 
and as this Order demonstrates, littl e or nothing in the way of 
mitigation. " • • .,',•..••: ' .: .- . : 
S0SFBSSXOH IS THE BEBS&BTm &SBCTIOM FOE MR. R&SMDSSEV'S MISCOHDUCT 
The Standards set forth the presumptive sanctions for broad .. 
categories of misconduct.,, absent the existence of aggravating or 
mitigating circumstances. .See Rule .1 4-605, Standards. Pursuant" to 
* "<«• c-*: andards: ' " ' . . "' 
Suspei is. 1 on is generally appropriate when SL lawyer: 
(1} knowingly engages in professional misconduct as. aermed . 
in Rule 8.4(a), (d) , (e) , or '(f) of the Snl.es of 
Professional Conduct and causes injury or potential injury 
to a party, the public, or the legal system, or causes 
interference or potential interference with a leaal 
proceeding, .'.*••' 
Rule 14-605(b), Standards. ". 
m
 ,:
 Sasmussen's misconduct falls within the ambit of subsection 
(b)(1) of Rule 14-605 (b), which ±s sufficient to establish suspension 
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SASM03SEN .MATTER ¥AGE 12 .:' • - ORDER 
as the appropriate presumptive discipline. 
THIS AJG^KZCVATTNTI CTPCnHSTAHCRR APPf.I ('ABi.K 111 'THIS C'ft.SP 
Aggravating factors are *any considerations or factors 'that "may 
justify an increase in the degree of discipline to be imposed.* Rule 
1,4 bu:{i\ Itit raurts already tound and the evidence to be presented, 
establish the following aggravating factors. 
A- Prior Record <.. - .~»i ***• Lr-~ »w 
A prior record o: discipline is an aggravating factor. Rule 14 -
607(a)(1), Standards. The evidence shows That Mr « asrausser* received 
i stayed suspension and oyo yedii piobdt ,'>n on August Ji, J.UOO. 
B 'In I I-i ijh or Dishonest Motive 
_ The .evidence shows that Mr, Rason,- -* ; t^y* 
i:or rns own convenience and acknowledgment that he was not prepa? ~: 
Mi". Rasmussen's violations of the Court's Order and, .procedural, rules ; 
so that he wou'Jd not have to drive In Monticeilo and appear at "trial 
show his selfish motive for .bis actions and qualifies as an, • 
aggravating factor. 
A pattern of misconduct Is an aggravating factor. In another 
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R&5MQ55EN MATTER irAisfc i^ 5 
unrelated informal Bar Cor^laint which has not yet been adjudicated, 
Mr. Rasmussen has engaged in conduct that wasted the resources of the 
Court and opposing counsel. He asked for several continuances by 
telephone jacnd eventually withdrew, however his client was not informed 
about the withdrawal until he appeared at the pretrial. 
D« Refusal to Acknowledge the Wrongful Nature of the Misconduct 
Either to the Client or to the Disciplinary authority 
Mr. Rasmussen did not acknowledge his wrongdoing when he was 
before the Court. Mr. Rasmussen also failed to acknowledge that he 
erred in any way before the OPC brought a discipline Complaint in this 
matter. 
E* Substantial Experience in the Practice of Law 
Mr. Rasmussen was admitted to practice law in Utah on October 6, 
1981. Mr. Rasmussen had been an attorney for 27 years when this 
misconduct occurred. Twenty-seven years of practice is substantial 
experience and Mr. Rasmussen knew or should have known that his 
conduct was inappropriate. 
MITIGATION OFFERED BY MR. RASMUSSEN 
Mr. Rasmussen did not inform the OPC of any evidence of 
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RASMUSSEN HOTTER PAGE 1 4 ORDliJ< 
mitigating circumstances. The OPC served Interrogatories and a 
Request for Production of Documents on Mr. Rasmussen on Noveaiber 23,. 
2009. The discovery requests asked Mr, Rasmussen to identi fy any 
possible mitigating factors , assisting a sanction hearing was held in 
t h i s matter
 r ar\d to provide any documents or other evidence to support 
the assertion. Mr. Rasmussen did not respond to'.the Request for 
Production of Documents. Mr. Rasmussen objected: to-the Interrogatory 
and indicated the Interrogatory was *based on a premise that i s purely 
speculative.* Mr. Rasmussen did not supplement h is responses to the 
Interrogatories. 
The evidence of mitigation must be substantial and s ignif icant ly 
outweigh the evidence of aggravation for the Court to lower the 
d isc ip l ine from the presumptive leve l of suspension. The Supreme 
Court has explained that ~tjo jus t i fy a departure from the presumptive 
leve l of d isc ip l ine set forth in..the Standards, the aggravating and 
mitigating factors must be s ignif icant ,* See Dace, 957 P.2d at 1237-
1238,-2 se& Tn TY* BrmATvp, 2001 UT 111, f i l l , 12 (Utah 2001). Further, 
In Ince, the Supreae Court concluded that the Distr ict Court ^accorded too much 
weight to sdtigating ractors which were not particularly cospell ing. Hiis i s 
especial ly true given the nmaber of aggravating factors that existed- Tims, the 
weight of the mitigating factors i s at least balanced by the aggravating factors. 
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the Court *tsust consider [] the mitigating factors in l i ght of the 
particular misconduct.41' See Stufebs, 974 P.2d at 300. Mr. Kasimissen 
has yet to express remorse in regard t:o h is misconduct. Mr. Rassiussen 
did not raise any s ignif icant mitigation at the hearing... The 
respondent argued at t r i a l that no one was damaged and that he paid 
the monetary penalty imposed and that should he suf f i c i ent . 
The Court does not accept the argument of the respondent- There 
i s no question of the v io lat ion and the lack of any mitigating 
circumstances. The application of the Standards c a l l s for suspension 
and the t o t a l i t y of the circumstances, including numerous examples of 
s ignif icant aggravating circumstances, certainly warrants i t . 
Pursuant to the Standards, "Generally/ suspension should he 
isqposed for a speci f ic period of time equal to or greater than s i x 
souths, but in no event should the time period prior t o application 
:or reinstatement be more than three years.M Rule 2 .3 (a ) , Standards, 
nder .such c i r o s s t a n c e s , no adjustment to the prestaaaptiveiy appropriate level of 
i s c ip l ine i s warranted.* Ince. 957 P. 2d at 1238r see a l so In re gT*r*enga. 2001 UT 
11, f 11 (although t r i a l court correctly determined disbarment was appropriate 
resumptive sanction, i t erroneously concluded mitigating factors; were suff ic ient to 
vercoae presun^tion). 
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RASMQSSSN MATTER PAGE 16 ORDER 
The Court will enter a suspension for one year* in this matter but 
will stay all but 181 days. The Court is staying the imposition of the 
remaining time upon the following terms and conditions: 
1. That he enter and complete an ethics and professional 
conduct course by the end of the 181 day suspension. 
2. That he not practice law during the suspension and so 
certify that fact by affidavit. 
3. That he have no violations of the rules for one year 
from the date of this Order. 
4. That he will initiate a change in his office procedure 
whereby he personally communicates with the Court, its staff and 
opposing counsel and all such cosssunication will be memorialized in 
his case file and will include the date, time and the named individual 
ccHnaunicated with. Additionally, all changes of court dates must be 
followed by written congmrni cation to the Court. 
Dated this 20** day of July, 2010. 
BY TSS COURT 
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RASMU5SEN MATTER PAGE 17 ORDER 
MATTiTNG CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Order of Sanction, this cl[ day of July, 2010, to the 
following r 
Diana Akiyaiaa 
Assistant Counsel 
Office of Professional Conduct 
Utah State Bar 
645 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
James H. Deans 
Attorney for Respondent 
440 South 700 East, Suite 101 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
•?m*> fofl *£. 
Deputy Court Clerk 
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Addendum "G" 
Letter, dated December 20, 2010 from OPC to Rasmussen 
(the "December Letter"). 
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Utah State Bar 
Office of Professional Conduct 
645 South 200 East. Suite 205 • Sail Lake City, Utah 84111 -3834 
Telephone: {801} 531-S110 » FAX: {801} 531-9912 • 1-800-698-9077 
E-mail: opc^ utanbar.org 
December 20, 2010 
James H. Deans 
440 South 700 East #101 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 " ^ ^ ^ _ 
Re: In the Matter of the Discipline of Thomas V. Rasmussen 
Civil No. 090908841 
Dear Mr. Deans: 
This morning the OPC was notified that Mr. Rasmussen called the 8lh 
District Court and held himself out as an attorney representing a client, it also 
appears that Mr. Rasmussen did not notify the court of his suspension. As you 
are aware, the Order of Sanction in this matter was signed on July 21, 2010. 
Pursuant to Ruie 14-526 of the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability, unless 
otherwise stated in the order, a suspension is effective 30 days after the date of 
the order. 
Because Mr. Rasmussen has been suspended for six months and a day, 
he may not represent clients, hold himself out as an attorney or otherwise 
engage in the practice of law. If Mr. Rasmussen continues to practice while on 
suspension the OPC will file an Order to Show Cause. Also to date, we have not 
received anything from Mr. Rasmussen regarding his obligations under Rule 14-
526 of the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability. 
I direct your attention to Ruie 14-526 of the Rules of Lawyer Discipline 
and Disability with respect to Mr. Rasmussen's responsibilities. Thank you for 
your attention to this matter 
Sincerely, 
Diane Akiyama 
Assistant Counsel 
Office of Professional Conduct 
DA/aw 
33 ft 
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Addendum "H" 
Affidavit of John Schriver, dated July 29, 2010 
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JAMES H. DEANS, #846 
Attorney for Respondent 
440 South 700 East, #101 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 575-5005 
Facsimile: (801} 531-8780 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the : AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT 
Discipline of: OF THOMAS V. RASMUSSEN 
Thomas V. Rasmussen, #2693 : Civil No. 090908841 
Respondent. : Judge L. A. Dever 
State of Utah 
:ss. 
County of Salt Lake 
COMES NOW JOHN P. SCHRIVER, the undersigned affiant, having 
h&^n first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as follows: 
1. I have personal knowledge of all facts and circumstances 
set forth below, and would testify to the same if called upon to do 
so. 
2. I, John P. Schriver, was charged in 2007 with a Felony in 
San Juan County, Utah, Case No. 0717-49. The Felony charge was for 
a crime I did not commit. 
3. Because of my prior poor experience with Judge Anderson, 
in a civil matter, I felt that the only way I could get a fair 
Witt DISTHIOT mmi 
Third Judkr;c. ^ , .-:-* y 
WS*:::J 
By-
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chance in my Felony case was to hire an attorney outside of the San 
Juan County and Grand County areas where Judge Anderson is the only 
regularly sitting District Court Judge. The local lawyers appear 
to be afraid to deal too firmly with Judge Anderson out of a fear 
of reprisals. 
4. I, therefore, made the decision to retain Thomas V. 
Rasmussen, Attorney at Law, from Salt Lake County. 
5. During the course of Mr. Rasmussen's representation of me 
on the San Juan County matter, he and his paralegal were always 
available to answer my questions and meet my needs. 
6. When Mr. Rasmussen finalized a plea bargain with the 
prosecutor, I was pleased with his efforts, because he had 
eliminated the Felony charge completely and saved me the cost and 
risk of a trial. 
7. Although the Court was informed of the finalized plea 
bargain on Monday morning rather than Friday afternoon, because of 
my unavailability to approve it, Judge Anderson had made it clear 
in open Court that a tardy plea bargain still had a chance of being 
accepted by him.* 
8. While we were waiting for Judge Anderson's approval of 
the final plea bargain, I instructed Mr. Rasmussen to not work on 
my case any further so as to not incur any new legal fees. 
9. When Judge Anderson belatedly denied the final plea 
bargain, only three days before my trial date, I was scared to 
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death, remembering ray prior experience with him, and was convinced 
that Judge Anderson had absolutely no interest in providing me with 
a fair trial. 
10. I expressed my concerns to Mr. Rasmussen who told me that 
he would do everything in his power to try to protect my 
Constitutional Rights to a fair and impartial trial, under the Utah 
and the United States Constitutions. 
11. Mr. Rasmussen informed me that he would file a Motion in 
an effort to protect my Constitutional Rights to a fair trial. 
12. Prior to my trial date, 1 was informed by Mr. Rasmussen 
that he believed that based on the filed Motion in my Felony case 
Judge Anderson was prohibited by law from going forward with the 
trial. Because of my immense fear that Judge Anderson would still 
go forward with the trial in spite of the Motion and given our lack 
of opportunity to prepare (eg., no time to subpoenae a critical 
witness) caused by Judge Anderson's own belated rejection of the 
plea bargain, Mr. Rasmussen told me that he would not be making the 
ten hour round trip to appear in Court based on his belief that the 
trial could not legally go forward on the scheduled date. Mr. 
Rasmussen, however, insisted that I appear on the trial date to 
avoid any kind of bench warrant being issued for my arrest. This 
I willingly did at no inconvenience to myseslf, because 1 lived 
relatively close to the courthouse. 
13. Judge Anderson's untimely denial of the plea bargain 
prevented my eye witness to the event in question from being 
properly subpoenaed as a witness for my defense. He needed a 
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subpoena to get off work. 
14. At no time did I ever feel harmed or inconvenienced by 
Mr. Rasmussen, To the contrary, it appeared he always had my best 
interests in mind, even when he was working for free, 
15. I appreciated and still appreciate all of the efforts 
that Mr. Rasmussen expended on my behalf to protect all of my 
Constitutional Rights, following Judge Anderson's belated rejection 
of the original plea bargain. In fact, Mr. Rasmussen did not 
charge me a penny for any of his time, including travel to San Juan 
County, or expertise, from that time forward. He sacrificed 
earning five thousand dollars, which he would have earned 
by trying my case. Instead, at great sacrifice to himself, he 
protected my best interests and secured my future, while paying two 
thousand dollars out of his own pocket to the Court. 
16. Had Mr. Rasmussen placed his own interests ahead of mine, 
he would have simply collected $5,000.00 from me to try my case and 
then let the chips fall where they may. A trial may have resulted 
in my being convicted of a Felony I did not commit. In the 
alternative, Mr. Rasmussen, himself, paid $2,000.00, to the Court 
and refused to charge me another penny on my case. 
17. In the end, I was allowed by Judge Anderson to enter a 
plea to a plea bargain almost identical to the original one. I 
feel that the prosecutor on my case bore neither me nor Mr. 
Rasmussen any ill will or he would not have basically re-instated 
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the original plea bargain heretofore belately rejected by Judge 
Anderson. 
18. At no time did I ever feel inconvenienced or harmed by 
Mr. Rasmussen. To the contrary, his loyalty to me and his 
dedication to preserving my Constitutional Rights allowed me to 
avoid, as a certainty, a conviction for a Felony I did not commit. 
19. Because of the loyalty and dedication that Mr. Rasmussen 
showed to me, my wife and I attended the Utah State Bar's Screening 
Panel in support of Mr. Rasmussen. We could not believe that any 
attorney of his caliber and honesty would be subjected to 
discipline because of Judge Anderson's lack of timely 
communication. 
20. My wife and I fully intended on coming to the hearing 
scheduled on June 1, 2010, in the Salt Lake District Court to tell 
anyone who would listen what a credit Mr. Rasmussen is to the legal 
profession, but our schedules would not permit our attendance. We 
were informed that the District Court in Salt Lake was unwilling to 
continue the hearing to allow us to attend. 
21. Again, at no time was I ever harmed by Mr. Rasmussen, who 
kept me constantly informed and fully apprised of everything 
happening in my case from its beginning to its end. Without his 
help, the only person who was in a position to harm me and, in 
fact, was harming me through his lack of communication was Judge 
Anderson. Mr. Rasmussen's efforts prevented any harm from 
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happening to me, and it now appears Judge Anderson, through the 
Utah State Bar, desires to transfer that harm from me to my 
dedicated attorney, Mr. Rasmussen. 
DATED this ^ 2 ^ day of July, 2010. 
.Affiant 
John P. Schriver 
VERIFICATION AM) ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
That personally appeared before me JOHN P. SCHRIVER, who has 
stated to me that the above-stated facts are based upon his 
personal knowledge and are truthful. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this r^7 , day of July, 
2010. 
NOnARY PUBLIC 
Ba»*8.UeAerg 
#577820 
COMMISSION EXPIRES 
Febfu*yl5,20X3 
STATE OF UTAH 
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Addendum "P 
SUP. CT. R. OF PROF. PRAC, 
UT. LAWYER DISC, AND DISAB. Rule 14-501 
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Article 5. Lawyer Discipline and Disability 
Rule 14-501. Purpose, authority, scope and structure of lawyer disciplinary and disability proceedings. 
(a) The purpose of lawyer disciplinary and disability proceedings is to ensure and maintain the high standard of professional 
conduct required of those who undertake the discharge of professional responsibilities as lawyers and to protect the public 
and the administration of justice from those who have demonstrated by their conduct that they are unable or unlikely to 
properly discharge their professional responsibilities. 
(b) Under Article VIII, Section 4 of the Constitution of Utah, the Utah Supreme Court has exclusive authority within Utah to 
adopt and enforce rules governing the practice of law, including admission to practice law and the conduct and discipline of 
persons admitted to practice law. 
(c) All disciplinary proceedings shall be conducted in accordance with this article and Article 6, Standards for Imposing 
Lawyer Sanctions. Formal disciplinary and disability proceedings are civil in nature. These rules shall be construed so as to 
achieve substantial justice and fairness in disciplinary matters with dispatch and at the least expense to all concerned 
parties. 
(d) The interests of the public, the courts, and the legal profession all require that disciplinary proceedings at all levels be 
undertaken and construed to secure the just and speedy resolution of every complaint. 
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Addendum "J" 
SUP. CT. R. OF PROF. PRAC, 
UT. LAWYER DISC, AND DISAB. Rule 14-509 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Rule 14-509. Grounds for discipline. 
It shall be a ground for discipline for a lawyer to: 
(a) violate the Rules of Professional Conduct; 
(b) willfully violate a valid order of a court or a screening panel imposing discipline; 
(c) be publicly disciplined in another jurisdiction; 
(d) fail to comply with the requirements of Rule 14-526(e); or 
(e) rail to notify the OPC of public discipline in another jurisdiction in accordance with Rule 14-522(a). 
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Addendum "K" 
SUP. CT. R. OF PROF. PRAC, 
UT. LAWYER DISC, AND DISAB. Rule 14-524 
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Rule 14-524. Reinstatement following a suspension of six months or less. 
A respondent who has been suspended for six months or less pursuant to disciplinary proceedings shall be reinstated at the 
end of the period of suspension upon filing with the district court and serving upon OPC counsel an affidavit stating that the 
respondent has fully complied with the requirements of the suspension order and that the respondent has fully reimbursed 
the Bar's Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection for any amounts paid on account of the respondent's conduct. Within ten days, 
OPC counsel may file an objection and thereafter the district court shall conduct a hearing. 
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Addendum "L" 
SUP. CT. R. OF PROF. PRAC, 
UT. LAWYER DISC, AND DISAB. Rule 14-525 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Rule 14-525. Reinstatement following a suspension of more than six months; readmission. 
(a) Generally. A respondent suspended for more than six months or a disbarred respondent shall be reinstated or readmitted 
only upon order of the district court. No respondent may petition for reinstatement until three months before the period for 
suspension has expired. No respondent may petition for readmission until five years after the effective date of disbarment. A 
respondent who has been placed on interim suspension and is then disbarred for the same misconduct that was the ground 
for the interim suspension may petition for readmission at the expiration of five years from the effective date of the interim 
suspension. 
(b) Petition. A petition for reinstatement or readmission shall be verified, filed with the district court, and shall specify with 
particularity the manner in which the respondent meets each of the criteria specified in paragraph (e) or, if not, why there is 
otherwise good and sufficient reason for reinstatement or readmission. With specific reference to paragraph (e)(4), prior to 
the filing of a petition for readmission, the respondent must receive a report and recommendation from the Bar's Character 
and Fitness Committee. In addition to receiving the report and recommendation from the Character and Fitness Committee, 
the respondent must satisfy all other requirements as set forth in Article 7, Admissions. Prior to or as part of the 
respondent's petition, the respondent may request modification or abatement of conditions of discipline, reinstatement or 
readmission. 
(c) Service of petition. The respondent shall serve a copy of the petition upon OPC counsel. 
(d) Publication of notice of petition. At the time a respondent files a petition for reinstatement or readmission, OPC counsel 
shall publish a notice of the petition in the Utah Bar Journal. The notice shall inform members of the Bar about the 
application for reinstatement or readmission, and shall request that any individuals file notice of their opposition or 
concurrence with the district court within 30 days of the date of publication. In addition, OPC counsel shall notify each 
complainant in the disciplinary proceeding that led to the respondent's suspension or disbarment that the respondent is 
applying for reinstatement or readmission, and shall inform each complainant that the complainant has 30 days from the 
date of mailing to raise objections to or to support the respondent's petition. Notice shall be mailed to the last known 
address of each complainant in OPC counsel's records. 
(e) Criteria for reinstatement and readmission. A respondent may be reinstated or readmitted only if the respondent meets 
each of the following criteria, or, if not, presents good and sufficient reason why the respondent should nevertheless be 
reinstated or readmitted. 
(e)(1) The respondent has fully complied with the terms and conditions of all prior disciplinary orders except to the extent 
they are abated by the district court. 
(e)(2) The respondent has not engaged nor attempted to engage in the unauthorized practice of law during the period of 
suspension or disbarment. 
(e)(3) If the respondent was suffering from a physical or mental disability or impairment which was a causative factor of the 
respondent's misconduct, including substance abuse, the disability or impairment has been removed. Where substance 
abuse was a causative factor in the respondent's misconduct, the respondent shall not be reinstated or readmitted unless: 
(e)(3)(A) the respondent has recovered from the substance abuse as demonstrated by a meaningful and sustained period of 
successful rehabilitation; 
(e)(3)(B) the respondent has abstained from the use of the abused substance and the unlawful use of controlled substances 
for the preceding six months; and 
(e)(3)(C) the respondent is likely to continue to abstain from the substance abused and the unlawful use of controlled 
substances. 
(e)(4) Notwithstanding the conduct for which the respondent was disciplined, the respondent has the requisite honesty and 
integrity to practice law. In readmission cases, the respondent must appear before the Bar's Character and Fitness 
Committee and cooperate in its investigation of the respondent. A copy of the Character and Fitness Committee's report and 
recommendation shall be provided to the OPC and forwarded to the district court assigned to the petition after the 
respondent files a petition. 
(e)(5) The respondent has kept informed about recent developments in the law and is competent to practice. 
(e)(6) In cases of suspensions for one year or more, the respondent shall be required to pass the Multistate Professional 
Responsibility Examination. 
(e)(7) In all cases of disbarment, the respondent shall be required to pass the student applicant Bar Examination and the 
Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination. 
(e)(8) The respondent has fully reimbursed the Bar's Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection for any amounts paid on account of 
the respondent's conduct. 
(f) Review of petition. Within 60 days after receiving a respondent's petition for reinstatement or readmission, OPC counsel 
shall either: 
(f)(1) advise the respondent and the district court that OPC counsel will not object to the respondent's reinstatement or 
readmission; or 
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(f)(2) file a written objection to the petition. 
(g) Hearing; report. If an objection is filed by OPC counsel, the district court, as soon as reasonably practicable and within a 
target date of 90 days of the filing of the petition, shall conduct a hearing at which the respondent shall have the burden of 
demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that the respondent has met each of the criteria in paragraph (e) or, if 
not, that there is good and sufficient reason why the respondent should nevertheless be reinstated or readmitted. The 
district court shall enter its findings and order. If no objection is filed by OPC counsel, the district court shall review the 
petition without a hearing and enter its findings and order. 
(h) Successive petitions. Unless otherwise ordered by the district court, no respondent shall apply for reinstatement or 
readmission within one year following an adverse judgment upon a petition for reinstatement or readmission. 
(i) Conditions of reinstatement or readmission. The district court may impose conditions on a respondent's reinstatement or 
readmission if the respondent has met the burden of proof justifying reinstatement or readmission, but the district court 
reasonably believes that further precautions should be taken to ensure that the public will be protected upon the 
respondent's return to practice. 
(j) Reciprocal reinstatement or readmission. If a respondent has been suspended or disbarred solely on the basis of 
discipline imposed by another court, another jurisdiction, or a regulatory body having disciplinary jurisdiction, and if the 
respondent is later reinstated or readmitted by that court, jurisdiction or regulatory body, the respondent may petition for 
reciprocal reinstatement or readmission in Utah. The respondent shall file with the district court and serve upon OPC counsel 
a petition for reciprocal reinstatement or readmission, as the case may be. The petition shall include a certified or otherwise 
authenticated copy of the order of reinstatement or readmission from the other court, jurisdiction or regulatory body. Within 
20 days of service of the petition, OPC counsel may file an objection thereto based solely upon substantial procedural 
irregularities. If an objection is filed, the district court shall hold a hearing and enter its finding and order. If no objection is 
filed, the district court shall enter its order based upon the petition. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Addendum "M" 
SUP. CT. R. OF PROF. PRAC, 
UT. LAWYER DISC, AND DISAB. Rule 14-526 
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Rule 14-526. Notice of disability or suspension; return of clients' property; refund of unearned fees. 
(a) Effective date of order; winding up affairs. Each order that imposes disbarment or suspension is effective 30 days after 
the date of the order, or at such other time as the order provides. Each order that transfers a respondent to disability status 
is effective immediately upon the date of the order, unless the order otherwise provides. After the entry of any order of 
disbarment, suspension, or transfer to disability status, the respondent shall not accept any new retainer or employment as 
a lawyer in any new case or legal matter; provided, however, that during any period between the date of entry of an order 
and its effective date, the respondent may, with the consent of the client after full disclosure, wind up or complete any 
matters pending on the date of entry of the order. 
(b) Notice to clients and others. In every case in which a respondent is disbarred or suspended for more than six months, 
the respondent shall, within 20 days of the entry of the order, accomplish the following acts: 
(b)(1) notify each client and any co-counsel in every pending legal matter, litigation and non-litigation, that the respondent 
has been disbarred or suspended from the practice of law and is disqualified from further participation in the matter; 
(b)(2) notify each client that, in the absence of co-counsel, the client should obtain a new lawyer, calling attention to the 
urgency to seek new counsel, particularly in pending litigation; 
(b)(3) deliver to every client any papers or other property to which the client is entitled or, if delivery cannot reasonably be 
made, make arrangements satisfactory to the client or co-counsel of a reasonable time and place where papers and other 
property may be obtained, calling attention to any urgency to obtain the same; 
(b)(4) refund any part of any fee paid in advance that has not been earned as of the effective date of the discipline; 
(b)(5) in each matter pending before a court, agency or tribunal, notify opposing counsel or, in the absence of counsel, the 
adverse party, of the respondent's disbarment or suspension and consequent disqualification to further participate as a 
lawyer in the matter; 
(b)(6) file with the court, agency or tribunal before which any matter is pending a copy of the notice given to opposing 
counsel or to an adverse party; and 
(b)(7) within ten days after the effective date of disbarment or suspension, file an affidavit with OPC counsel showing 
complete performance of the foregoing requirements of this rule. The respondent shall keep and maintain for inspection by 
OPC counsel all records of the steps taken to accomplish the requirements of this rule. 
(c) Lien. Any attorney's lien for services rendered which are not tainted by reason of disbarment or suspension shall not be 
rendered invalid merely because of the order of discipline. 
(d) Other notice. If a respondent is suspended for six months or less, the district court may impose conditions similar to 
those set out in paragraph (b). In any public disciplinary matter, the district court may also require the issuance of notice to 
others as it deems necessary to protect the interests of clients or the public. 
(e) Compliance. Substantial compliance with the provisions of paragraphs (a), (b) and (d) shall be a precondition for 
reinstatement or readmission. Willful failure to comply with paragraphs (a), (b) and (d) shall constitute contempt of court 
and may be punished as such or by further disciplinary action. 
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Addendum "N" 
SUP. CT. R. OF PROF. PRAC, 
UT. LAWYER DISC, AND DISAB. Rule 14-604 
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Rule 14-604. Factors to be considered in imposing sanctions. 
The following factors should be considered in imposing a sanction after a finding of lawyer misconduct: 
(a) the duty violated; 
(b) the lawyer's mental state; 
(c) the potential or actual injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct; and 
(d) the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors. 
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Addendum "O" 
SUP. CT. R. OF PROF. PRAC, 
UT. LAWYER DISC, AND DISAB. Rule 14-605 
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Rule 14-605. Imposition of sanctions. 
Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon application of the factors set out in Rule 14-604, the following 
sanctions are generally appropriate. 
(a) Disbarment. Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer: 
(a)(1) knowingly engages in professional misconduct as defined in Rule 8.4(a), (d), (e), or (f) of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct with the intent to benefit the lawyer or another or to deceive the court, and causes serious or potentially serious 
injury to a party, the public, or the legal system, or causes serious or potentially serious interference with a legal 
proceeding; or 
(a)(2) engages in serious criminal conduct, a necessary element of which includes intentional interference with the 
administration of justice, false swearing, misrepresentation, fraud, extortion, misappropriation, or theft; or the sale, 
distribution, or importation of controlled substances; or the intentional killing of another; or an attempt or conspiracy or 
solicitation of another to commit any of these offenses; or 
(a)(3) engages in any other intentional misconduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation that seriously 
adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law. 
(b) Suspension. Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer: 
(b)(1) knowingly engages in professional misconduct as defined in Rule 8.4(a), (d), (e), or (f) of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct and causes injury or potential injury to a party, the public, or the legal system, or causes interference or potential 
interference with a legal proceeding; or 
(b)(2) engages in criminal conduct that does not contain the elements listed in Rule 14-605(a)(2) but nevertheless seriously 
adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law. 
(c) Reprimand. Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer: 
(c)(1) negligently engages in professional misconduct as defined in Rule 8.4(a), (d), (e), or (f) of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct and causes injury to a party, the public, or the legal system, or causes interference with a legal proceeding; or 
(c)(2) engages in any other misconduct that involves dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation and that adversely 
reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law. 
(d) Admonition. Admonition is generally appropriate when a lawyer: 
(d)(1) negligently engages in professional misconduct as defined in Rule 8.4(a), (d), (e), or (f) of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct and causes littie or no injury to a party, the public, or the legal system or interference with a legal proceeding, but 
exposes a party, the public, or the legal system to potential injury or causes potential interference with a legal proceeding; 
or 
(d)(2) engages in any professional misconduct not otherwise identified in this rule that adversely reflects on the lawyer's 
fitness to practice law. 
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Addendum "P" 
SUP. CT. R. OF PROF. PRAC, 
UT. LAWYER DISC, AND DISAB. Rule 14-606 
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Rule 14-606. Prior discipline orders. 
Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon application of the factors set out in Rule 14-604, the following 
principles generally apply in cases involving prior discipline. 
(a) The district court or Supreme Court may impose further sanctions upon a lawyer who violates the terms of a prior 
disciplinary order. 
(b) When a lawyer engages in misconduct similar to that for which the lawyer has previously been disciplined, the 
appropriate sanction will generally be one level more severe than the sanction the lawyer previously received, provided that 
the harm requisite for the higher sanction is present. 
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Addendum "Q" 
SUP. CT. R. OF PROF. PRAC, 
UT. LAWYER DISC, AND DISAB. Rule 14-607 
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Rule 14-607. Aggravation and mitigation. 
After misconduct has been established, aggravating and mitigating circumstances may be considered and weighed in 
deciding what sanction to impose. 
(a) Aggravating circumstances. Aggravating circumstances are any considerations or factors that may justify an increase in 
the degree of discipline to be imposed. Aggravating circumstances may include: 
(a)(1) prior record of discipline; 
(a)(2) dishonest or selfish motive; 
(a)(3) a pattern of misconduct; 
(a)(4) multiple offenses; 
(a)(5) obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with rules or orders of the disciplinary 
authority; 
(a)(6) submission of false evidence, false statements, or other deceptive practices during the disciplinary process; 
(a)(7) refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the misconduct involved, either to the client or to the disciplinary 
authority; 
(a)(8) vulnerability of victim; 
(a)(9) substantial experience in the practice of law; 
(a)(10) lack of good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify the consequences of the misconduct involved; and 
(a)(ll) illegal conduct, including the use of controlled substances. 
(b) Mitigating circumstances. Mitigating circumstances are any considerations or factors that may justify a reduction in the 
degree of discipline to be imposed. Mitigating circumstances may include: 
(b)(1) absence of a prior record of discipline; 
(b)(2) absence of a dishonest or selfish motive; 
(b)(3) personal or emotional problems; 
(b)(4) timely good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify the consequences of the misconduct involved; 
(b)(5) full and free disclosure to the client or the disciplinary authority prior to the discovery of any misconduct or 
cooperative attitude toward proceedings; 
(b)(6) inexperience in the practice of law; 
(b)(7) good character or reputation; 
(b)(8) physical disability; 
(b)(9) mental disability or impairment, including substance abuse when: 
(b)(9)(A) the respondent is affected by a substance abuse or mental disability; and 
(b)(9)(B) the substance abuse or mental disability causally contributed to the misconduct; and 
(b)(9)(C) the respondent's recovery from the substance abuse or mental disability is demonstrated by a meaningful and 
sustained period of successful rehabilitation; and 
(b)(9)(D) the recovery arrested the misconduct and the recurrence of that misconduct is unlikely; 
(b)(10) unreasonable delay in disciplinary proceedings, provided that the respondent did not substantially contribute to the 
delay and provided further that the respondent has demonstrated prejudice resulting from the delay; 
(b)(ll) interim reform in circumstances not involving mental disability or impairment; 
(b)(12) imposition of other penalties or sanctions; 
(b)(13) remorse; and 
(b)(14) remoteness of prior offenses. 
(c) Other circumstances. The following circumstances should not be considered as either aggravating or mitigating: 
(c)(1) forced or compelled restitution; 
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(c)(2) withdrawal of complaint against the lawyer; 
(c)(3) resignation prior to completion of disciplinary proceedings; 
(c)(4) complainant's recommendation as to sanction; and 
(c)(5) failure of injured client to complain. 
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Addendum "R: 
UT. R. CIV. P. 59 and 60 
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Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment. 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of 
the issues, for any of the following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an action tried without a 
jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and 
conclusions of law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new judgment: 
(a)(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by 
which either party was prevented from having a fair trial. 
(a)(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors have been induced to assent to any general or 
special verdict, or to a finding on any question submitted to them by the court, by resort to a determination by chance or as 
a result of bribery, such misconduct may be proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors. 
(a)(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against. 
(a)(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the application, which he could not, with reasonable 
diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial. 
(a)(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice. 
(a)(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or that it is against law. 
(a)(7) Error in law. 
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later than 10 days after the entry of the judgment. 
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is made under Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall 
be supported by affidavit. Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be served with the motion. 
The opposing party has 10 days after such service within which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within which the 
affidavits or opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an additional period not exceeding 20 days either by 
the court for good cause shown or by the parties by written stipulation. The court may permit reply affidavits. 
(d) On initiative of court. Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment the court of its own initiative may order a new trial 
for any reason for which it might have granted a new trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall specify the grounds 
therefor. 
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter or amend the judgment shall be served not later than 10 days 
after entry of the judgment. 
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Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order. 
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors therein arising from 
oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of any party and after 
such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the 
appeal is docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending may be so corrected with leave of the 
appellate court. 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as 
are just, the court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, 
or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered 
evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud 
(whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the 
judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based 
has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; 
or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable 
time and for reasons (1), (2), or (3),not more than 3 months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. 
A motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not 
limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to 
set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as 
prescribed in these rules or by an independent action. 
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